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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This case stems from Covenants, Conditions, and Restriction (hereafter: CC&R)
violations, wherein the Respondents are; a.) operating a full time commercial business on
their property in the Park Wood Place subdivision (hereafter: PWP), which is known as the
River Cove Bed and Breakfast; b.) Respondents planted a row of arborvitae shrubs that form
a hedge, which constitutes a 'fence' and is located on the property line separating the two
parties'.

The hedge continues to grow beyond the CC&R height restrictions, blocking

Appellants protected view of the river and is a nuisance; c.) Respondents have breached a
written contract with Appellant to maintain the arborvitae hedge at a height of six (6) feet; d.)
Respondents have retaliated against Appellant by falsely accusing Appellant of multiple
crimes (Appellant was arrested and charged with a felony), spitefully planting additional
arborvitae shrubs and trees to block Appellants view of the river, and causing extreme
emotional distress to Appellant.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On September 23, 2010, Appellant Christina J. Greenfield filed a civil action against the
above-mentioned Respondents in Kootenai County District Court seeking injunctive relief
and damages as listed;
1.) that the Court enter an Order declaring that the Respondents operation of the Bed and

Breakfast in PWP is in violation of the CC&Rs;
2.) that the Court enter an Injunction prohibiting the Respondents from operating the Bed and
Breakfast, or any similar business in the Park Wood Place subdivision;
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3.) that the Court enter an Order Declaring that the arborvitae hedge as described herein
constitutes a fence and the Respondents are to maintain the arborvitae hedge, which
continues to violate the PWP CC&Rs height restrictions on fences;
4.) that the Court enter an Order declaring that the easement be cleared of all obstructions;
5.) that the Court award Appellant a judgment against the Respondents for Nuisance;
6.) that the Court enter an Order for Abatement requiring the Respondents to remove any and
all shrubs and trees located at or near the parties common property line that were planted
out of "spite", which block the Appellant's view of the river, obstruct the Appellant's free
use of property, and interfere with the Appellant's comfortable enjoyment of life and
property;
7.) that the Court enter an Injunction prohibiting the Respondents from planting any shrubs
or other vegetation at or near the common boundary line between the parties' real
property, which blocks the Appellant's long standing view of the Spokane River and
obstructing the Appellant's free use of her property, and interferes with the Appellant's
comfortable enjoyment of life and property;
8.) that the Court award the Appellant a judgment against the Respondents for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress;
9.) that the Court award the Appellant a judgment against the Respondents for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress;
10. that the Court award Appellant post-judgment interest on any judgment;
11. that the Court award Appellant her reasonable attorney fees;
12. that the Court award Appellant further relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable
under the circumstances.
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On May 24, 2012, Judge Lansing Haynes granted Appellant all motions on summary
judgment, except for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. After numerous delays by the
Respondents, a five day Jury Trial began on November 26, 2012.
On December 10, 2012, Appellant filed a J.N.O.V. Motion to overturn the jury's verdict, as
a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.

The Court DENIED Appellant's

J.N.O.V. on March 21, 2013. The district court DENIED Appellant's Motion to Reconsider on
May 2, 2013. Appellant filed her timely Notice of Appeal on June 12, 2013. The Court issued a
Final Amended Judgment on July 8, 2013. Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on July
24, 2013. Appellant now submits this brief in support of her appeal.
C. Statement of the Facts
1.) The Respondents are intentionally and / or recklessly unlawfully operating a full time,

year round commercial business that is open to the public, upon their real property, which
is named the "River Cove Bed and Breakfast." The business offers several overnight
accommodations and a wedding facility via internet advertising, and other marketing
sources. Said commercial business is "PROHIBITED" under the PWP CC&Rs.
2.) The Respondents have planted an arborvitae shrub hedge in a single row upon or near the
property line between parties' real property, which constitutes a "FENCE."

The

arborvitae hedge continues to grow and violate the height restriction for fences as
permitted by the PWP CC&Rs.
3.) Respondents have planted nine (9) additional arborvitae shrubs to existing hedge of
twenty-four (24) arborvitae and several large growing trees upon their real property, after
Appellant exercised her legal right to enforce the PWP CC&Rs. Said spite plantings
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obstruct and infringe upon the Appellant's real property blocking her coveted view of the
river, the free use of her property and the comfortable enjoyment oflife and property.
4.) Respondents entered into an agreement with the Appellant to maintain the arborvitae
hedge at the agreed upon height of six (6) feet in May 2006. Respondents breached said
agreement by allowing the arborvitae fence to grow to a height in excess of six (6) feet.
5.) Respondents have engaged in a retaliatory course of conduct to harass the Appellant by
planting spite shrubs and trees, installing surveillance cameras that face the Appellant's
property, intentionally and recklessly making false allegations to local law enforcement
about the Appellant, and manufacturing defamatory statements about the Appellant to
news sources. One allegation resulted in the Appellant being arrested and charged with a
Felony, which she was eventually acquitted of nineteen (19) months later.
6.) Due to the intentional and/ or negligent actions of the Respondents as set forth above, the
Appellant suffers from severe physical manifestations and emotional distress.

II. ISSUES
a) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their business,
the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility did not violate the
neighborhood CC&Rs?
b) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their business,
the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility was "Not open to the
public"?
c) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their business,
the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility, qualifies as a "Home
Occupation" and not a "Business" as so defined in the neighborhood CC&Rs?
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d) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' lack of maintenance of the
arborvitae hedge, which is located on or near the real property line that separates both
properties, did not violate the neighborhood CC&Rs height restrictions and therefore
refuse to enter an Injunction prohibiting the Respondents' from allowing the arborvitae
shrubs to exceed the height restrictions as set forth in the neighborhood CC&Rs?
e) Did the District Court err in its finding that the arborvitae shrubs that form a hedge did
not constitute a "Fence"?
f) Did the District Court err in its finding that the arborvitae shrubs that form a hedge, as

mentioned above, are to be considered trees?
g) Did the District Court err in its finding that the arborvitae hedge is solely located on the
Respondents' property when a mutual ownership was evident on both surveys?
h) Did the District Court err in its finding that Appellant should be accused and assessed
damages for intentionally and willfully committed Timber Trespass to the property of
Respondents wherein LC. § 6-202 allowing for treble damages would have applied when
a dual ownership of the arborvitae (shrub) hedge, which is located on or near the
adjoining property line of both the Appellant and Respondents, is evident?
i) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Appellant should be assessed "Timber"
damages for property (arborvitae hedge) that she equally owns, after the Appellant
trimmed said arborvitae hedge to the agreed upon height, which was previously cut four
years prior to the same height by the Respondent at which time it was neither damaged or
destroyed?
j) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Appellant has intentionally, willfully or
negligently damaged and/ or destroyed the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs in question?
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k) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err in his finding that the
Respondents' asserted legal claims for "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress"
during the trial were properly disclosed, when in fact, the District Court Honorable Judge
Lansing Haynes had previously dismissed the Respondents' original claim of Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress on March 22, 2011 with Prejudice?
1) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' violation of the
neighborhood CC&Rs by operating a business, the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and
wedding event facility, and the arrest of the Appellant after trimming said arborvitae
hedge, along with constant harassment, including many false allegations of crimes
reported by the Respondents, did not cause extreme negligent emotional distress on the
Appellant?
m) Did the District Court err in its finding that the jury instructions and the special verdict
form were properly amended and submitted within the time frame as specified under

I.R.C.P. 51(a)(l)?
n) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' Survey was properly signed
and introduced into evidence?
o) Did the District Court err in its finding that Respondents' did not purposely and or
negligently plant large trees and or shrubs to intentionally block Appellant's view of the
Spokane River, which infringes upon Appellant's real property, obstructs her free use of
property and interferes with her comfortable enjoyment of life and property?
p) Did the District Court err in its finding that the large trees and or shrubs that were planted
intentionally to block Appellant's granted view of the Spokane River, which infringes
upon Appellant's real property, obstructs her free use of property, and interferes with her
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comfortable enjoyment of life and property, should be abated by the Respondents' and
ordered an injunction prohibiting future obstructions of Appellant's view of the Spokane
River, and not interfere with her comfortable enjoyment oflife and property?
q) Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to Due Process, which prohibits state and local governments from
depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without certain steps being taken to ensure
fairness and to recognize her substantive and procedural rights?
r) Did the District Court err in allowing excessive awards of damages and attorney fees to
the Respondents'?
s) Did the District Court err in determining whether damages were correctly assessed in
accordance with the finding for and the allowable amount of awards of damages and
attorney fees to the Respondents?
t) Did the District Court err by depriving Appellant her rights by violating 42 USC § 1983 Civil action for deprivation of rights and due process?
u) Did the District Court Judge Lansing Haynes express an "appearance of partiality"
against Greenfield during the proceedings?
v) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by not disqualifying himself,
as well as his law clerk, Schuyler A. Pennington, from the court proceedings do to their
affiliation with the Knights Of Columbus, an inclusive Catholic organization of men,
wherein Eric Wurmlinger is also affiliated with such organization, therefore causing
prejudicial bias within the judicial outcome of the case?
w) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by allowing the Defendants
'Unclean hands' to mislead the trial court into believing that certain Trial Exhibits were
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factual, wherein said exhibits were submitted "Incomplete" or contained "Unacceptable"
information?
x) Did the District Court base its findings upon unsubstantiated and incompetent evidence
from the Respondents', and did that evidence support the district courts conclusions of
law wherein the Appellant was prejudiced by said evidence?
y) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by giving the jury improper
instructions?
z) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by failure to Order an
Abatement requiring the Respondents' to remove any and all shrubs and trees located at
or near the parties common property line which obstruct the Appellant's free use of
property, and interferes with the Appellant's comfortable enjoyment oflife and property?
aa) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by failure to Enter an
Injunction prohibiting the Respondents' from planting any trees, shrubs, or other
vegetation which blocks the Appellant's view of the Spokane River or otherwise obstructs
the Appellant's free use of property, and interferes with the Appellant's comfortable
enjoyment of life and property?
bb) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes commit Fraud Upon the Court as
witnessed and verified by the Appellant on December 30, 2013, after Appellant viewed
her case file, wherein the Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes commented in his case file
notes "The only issue that concerns me is the N.I.E.D. (Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress) claim being dismissed ... We can play up the former counsel's decision and the
no objection to putting it to the jury later on" wherein Judge Haynes openly admits by
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acknowledging concerns and states "We can Play up ... " the N.I.E.D. claim that Judge
Haynes had dismissed with prejudice a year and a half prior to trial?
III.ARGUMENT
DUE TO RELATIVELY LENGTHY AMOUNT OF ISSUES IN THIS CASE,
APPELLANT IS CONSOLIDATING ISSUES BY SUBJECT MATTER
A. Consolidating Issues (a)(b)(c) CC&R Violations for Respondents Business

Respondents, Eric and Rosalyn Wurmlinger entered into a contractual agreement
in 1994, when they purchased their property in a Post Falls subdivision known as Park
Wood Place (PWP), which is zoned as single family residential.
The PWP lots are governed by covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs)
(See Appellant's Trial Exhibit #1, CC&Rs, Pg. 1, ARTICLE I "Land Use" #1 Residential
Purposes, Pg. 2, ARTICLE II "Building Restrictions" # 1 Architectural Control
Committee, Pg. 3, Paragraph 2), which limits the use of said lots for residential purposes.

The PWP CCRs contain a broader prohibition that prevents the owners from operating a
business on their property; Paragraph #1 states "No lot shall be used except for residential
purposes." Respondent Eric Wurmlinger testified to his knowledge of the PWP CC&R

business prohibition, yet Respondents constructed their home to accommodate the bed
and breakfast commercial venture (See Trial Testimony Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 216, Lines
18-25, Pg. 217, Lines 1-5, Pg. 219, Lines 3-8, Lines 11-25, Pg. 220, Lines 1-4, Pg. 221,
Lines 11-13, Pg. 223, Lines 5-25, Pg. 224, lines 1-2, Pg. 225, Lines 6-13, Pg. 226, 9-14,
Pg. 232, Lines 17-19, Pg. 236, Lines 20-25, Pg. 243, Lines 5-6, Lines 12-25, Pg. 249,
Lines 4-8, Pg. 252, Lines 8-11, Pg. 253, Lines 5-6, Lines 21-25, Pg. 254, Lines 14-15,
Line 23, Pg. 255. Line 3, Pg. 261, Lines 7-18, Pg. 262, Lines 7-10, Pg. 280, Lines 18-25,
Pg. 281, Lines 8-18, Pg. 282, Lines 1-12, Pg. 283, Lines 7-18, Line 21-22, Pg. 349, Lines
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9-11, Lines 18-23). See Atwood; "The CC&Rs specifically prohibit the use of such lots
for any businesses."
The PWP CC&Rs may be amended by a 75% or more vote from the PWP
property owners (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #1, CC&Rs, Pg. 6, ARTICLE III "General

Provisions" #4 Amendments). To date, no amendment has successfully been adopted to
allow any businesses to operate in the PWP subdivision.
The Respondents promote their commercial business by advertising on their
website and with on-line booking agencies, wherein the public can view and purchase
overnight accommodations and wedding packages (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #2,

Coeur d'Alene Bed & Brealifast Association Internet Advertisements for the River Cove B
& B Accommodations and a Wedding Venue for up to 25 people and Trial Exhibit #26,
The River Cove B & B Internet Advertisement for a Wedding Venue for up to 40 people).
The Respondents have advertised in highly visible newspapers of their "open to the
public events" as well as local tourist venues (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #54, The

Spokesman Review Newspaper Article Advertising "Open-House" event "open to the
public"). The River Cove Bed and Breakfast operates seven days a week, twelve months
a year, patrons are allowed to park on the street, book and attend wedding events, come
and go at all hours of the night and day, and utilize the outdoor hot tub facility, as well as
other amenities (paddle boat and yacht) that are advertised on Respondents commercial
business website (See Clerks Record: Pg. 509, List of "Booking Sites" for River Cove

Bed and Breaifast and Trial testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 235, Lines 4-16).
This Court has repeatedly found restrictive covenants valid and enforceable,
which clearly restrict the use a party may put on his or her property. See Atwood v.
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Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P. 3d 310 (2006); Pinehaven, 138 Idaho at 829, 70 P. 3d at
667; Sun Valley Ctr. For the Arts & Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 411,
413, 690 P. 2d 346, 348 (1984); Brown, 129 Idaho at 192, 923 P. 2d at 437. "As a
derogation of the common law right to use land for lawful purposes, restrictive covenants
will not be extended by implication." Id. At 192, 923 P. 2d at 437; Birdwood, 145 Idaho
at 20, 175 P. 3d at 182. "When restrictive covenants clearly express (as the Park Wood
Place CC&Rs do), then the restrictions on the use of land shall be enforced." Brown 129
Idaho at 192, 923 P. 2d at 437; Becker v. Arnfeld, 466 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1970).
"''Where the language of the CC&Rs is clear and unambiguous, statutory
construction is unnecessary, and this Court need only determine the application of the
words to the facts of the case at hand. See Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 Idaho
568, 571, 21 P.3d 890, 893 (2001). "A statute (CC&Rs) is ambiguous where the language
is capable of more than one construction." Struhs v. Protection Techs. Inc., 133 Idaho
715, 718, 992 P.2d 164, 167 (1999). "Ambiguity is not established merely because
differing interpretations are presented to a court; otherwise, all statutes (CC&Rs) subject
to litigation would be considered ambiguous. Hamilton, 135 Idaho at 571, 21 P. 3d at
893. "The interpretation should begin with an examination of the literal words of the
statute (CC&R), and this language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning." Williamson v. City of McCall (In re Williamson), 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19 P.
3d 766, 769 (2001). 'Farm Bureau Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692 (2d
Cir. 1941), "342 P.2d at 933. "Words should be taken in that sense to which the
apparent object and intention of the parties limit them, and the courts will always
look behind the terminology to ascertain what the parties intended in making the
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contract." The determination of whether a document is ambiguous is a question of law,
over which we exercise free review. See Smith; Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho
604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 (2005) (citations omitted). In evaluating for ambiguity, this
Court will examine the relevant portions of the document "to determine whether [it] is
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." Id. (citations omitted).'"'
It is undisputed that the CC&Rs by impressing upon all lots in PWP subdivision

develop a uniform set of restrictive covenants, intended to establish a scheme or plan to
insure the development is a "residential area of high standards." Said PWP lots are taxed
at a premium rate due to their location in relationship to the river, which has resulted in a
residential area of high standards. A commercial business detracts from said "High
Standards" and decreases property values.
The Respondents business attracts a large number of the public on a daily basis,
through multiple internet advertising sites (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #26 A & B,
Respondents Website Advertisements), which creates excessive traffic, constant noise, and

intrusions from unwelcome patrons who stray onto adjacent properties, block driveways,
mail boxes, and causes street congestion (PWP is situated in a cul-de-sac with one
entrance). Said commercial business qualifies as a "Nuisance" (See Idaho Code §52-101
and Idaho Code §52-111) to neighboring property owners who must endure the numerous

commotions and annoyances year round.
It is further noted that Respondent Eric Wurmlinger, during testimony, uses the

word "Business" multiple times in referring to the River Cove Bed & Breakfast. The
Respondents submitted a claim for 'Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic
Advantage' referring to their commercial business, then later dismissed said claim (See

APPELLANT BRIEF

18

Clerks Record Pg. 48 and Pg. 5Q). Mr. Wunnlinger states "it started as a hobby then
grew into a full-time job." Respondents' commercial business produces a substantial
income compared to that of a "Hobby." (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #55, Revenue

Reports for Respondents Business and Appellants Trial Exhibit #109 and Appellants
Attached Exhibit # 1, Respondents Tax Records "Detail Report" for 2010). Appellant
believes that the trial judge did not properly construe the meaning of the restrictive
covenants under "Home Occupation".

A "Home Occupation" is considered a non-

intrusive occupation that is unseen and mostly kept hidden from view from adjacent
homeowners that does not change the appearance of the neighborhood and does not
becomes a nuisance.
It is obvious that the Respondents business is a highly successful commercial

business. See Metzner v. Wojdyla, 125 Wn.2d 445 (WA 1994) 886 P. 2d 154. ""Holding
that the Wojdylas operation of a licensed day care constituted a commercial enterprise
and is in violation of the restrictive covenants of the neighborhood. The phrase
"residential purposes" was interpreted by the Washington Court of Appeals in Hagemann
v. Worth, 56 Wn. App. 85 (1989) 782 P. 2d 1 072. In holding a group home violated the
restrictive covenant, the court noted that the term "residential" was the antonym of
"business" and that accepting paying customers was not svnonymous with a residential
purpose. This interpretation of "residential" was confirmed in Mains Farm Homeowners
Association v. Worthington, 64 Wash. App. 171, 824 P.2d 495 (1992). There the covenant
limited use to "single family residential purposes only." As in the Hagemann case,
operation of an adult group home was at issue."" The court focused on the business
nature of the enterprise and held it violated the restrictive covenant. '"'Respondent's use
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includes a commercial element because she receives payment for the care that she gives
unrelated adults in her home. The single-family residential nature of respondent's use of
her home is destroyed by the elements of commercialism ... " It is beyond question that
the Wojdylas are indeed operating a business. Like the state-licensed adult facilities in
Hagemann and Mains Farm, the child day care center operated by the Wojdylas accepts
money in exchange for the care of persons (in this instance, children) not related to them.

It is also licensed by the State and considered an "agency" under state law."" (See
Appellants Trial Exhibit #88, Idaho Business License for Respondents Business).

Appellant further argues that the Respondents are aware that the City of Post Falls
Zoning Ordinance requires that a bed & breakfast business owner must obtain a "Special
Use" Permit to operate a commercial venture in a residential zoned neighborhood. The
Respondents DO NOT have a "Special Use" permit; they operate under a "Home
Occupation" permit. Not only are the Respondents violating the PWP CC&Rs (See
Appellants Trial Exhibit #1, PWP CC&Rs, ARTICLE I "Land Use", #1 Residential
Purposes l:.g_J), they are also in violation of City of Post Falls "Home Occupation"

Permit (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #4, Business License Application and Home
Occupation Requirements, Pg. 3, (A) (1) (2) (3) (5) (8) (10)). Also; (See Trial Testimony
Christina Greenfield, Pg. 515, Lines 12-15 and Appellants Trial Exhibit #102, Photos of
Respondents "Home Occupation" Violations).

The Respondents attempted to modify a portion of the PWP CC&Rs (July 2011,
after Appellant filed her Claim against the Respondents; See Appellants Trial Exhibit
#104) by obtaining PWP homeowner signatures that were illegally notarized by

Respondent Rosalyn Wurmlinger, who is a Registered Notary for the State of Idaho,

APPELLANT BRIEF

20

which violates Idaho State laws for Notaries (See Idaho Code §51-108, Idaho Code §51112, Idaho Code §51-117, Idaho Code §51-119).

Respondent Rosalyn Wurrnlinger is sworn under oath to uphold the provisions of
Idaho State Code as a Notary for the State of Idaho. The signatures that Ms. Wurrnlinger
notarized are not legally binding under the "disqualifying interest" rules, therefore
invalidating the Instrument (See Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger Pg. 374, Line 25, Pg.
375, Lines 1-3, Lines 6-8, Pg. 380, Lines 11-15, Lines 18-25, Pg. 381, Lines 1-7, Line 1115, Pg. 417, Lines 2-15).

The Respondents then attempted to utilize this nullified document as trial
evidence (See Respondents Trial Exhibit #1) during court proceedings , which violates
Idaho Code (See Idaho Code §18-2601 and Idaho Code §18-2602).
B. Consolidating Issues (d)(e)(f)(aa) CC&R Fence Restrictions, 'Spite' Plantings, and
Injunctive Relief

Appellant purchased her property primarily for the coveted view of the river,
which Appellant paid a premium price for said view (See Trial Testimony of Kootenai
County Tax Assessor John Wilhelm Pg. 422, Line 18-19, Pg. 424, Lines 15-23, Pg. 425,
Lines 2-12).

The Appellants view of the river had been established in 1993 upon

completion of the Appellant's home (one year prior to the Respondents purchase of their
property), which Appellant purchased from the original homeowner in May 2005.

To ensure that the property owners who bought the higher priced premium
properties kept their views of the river, and other residential protections, an Architectural
Control Committee was established to protect their interests by drafting and enforcing a
Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
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It is mandated that all property owners within the PWP subdivision are to follow

the CC&Rs that run with the land perpetually binding all persons who hold any right,
title, or interest in said properties. The height restriction for PWP fences, and other like
structures, is set at a maximum height of five (5) feet and the approval of the
Architectural Control Committee was required before any property owner could erect any
fence or like structure (See Appellant's Trial Exhibit #1, Park Wood Place Protective
CC&Rs, Pg. 4, ARTICLE II "Building Restrictions", #2 Building Conditions).

When Appellant purchased her property, she was aware that the PWP CC&Rs
protected the coveted view of the river by certifying that adjacent property owners were
to adhere to the five (5) foot height restrictions for fences and like structures (including
hedges). Several of the homes that are located adjacent to the Greenfield property have
exceptional views of the Spokane River as well, and are taxed at a higher premium. These
homes were designed and approved by the Architectural Control Committee to avoid
interference with the protected views of the neighboring homes.
The Respondents were aware of the height restriction for fences (See Trial
Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 296, Lines 4-6, Lines 13- 25, Pg. 297, Lines 1-4, Pg.
299, Lines 3-11), yet Respondents willfully and intentionally allowed the 'Emerald

Green' arborvitae hedge they planted in 1994 -1995, on the adjoining property line, to
grow and exceed the five (5) foot PWP CC&R height requirement.

In May 2006,

Appellant hired attorney, Kacey Wall, to address the arborvitae height issue, wherein both
parties then agreed that Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, would maintain the arborvitae
hedge at a six (6) foot height (See Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 326, Lines 6-8,
Lines 16-17, Pg. 327, Lines 12-21 andAppellants TrialExhibit#16Pg. 2, #4).
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One month after said agreement, Respondent, Eric Wurm.linger, began retaliatory
attacks against the Appellant by planting spite shrubs and trees, which included; two (2)
large pine trees and two (2) large deciduous trees (planted June 2006), an additional nine
(9) arborvitae shrubs to the existing twenty-four (24) arborvitae shrubs (planted May
2008), two (2) large Maple trees (planted September 2012), next to the parties' property
line to completely block Appellants view of the river ((See Appellants Trial Exhibit #25
and #102(E) (Qefore plantings) and Exhibit #13 .from Clerks Record Pg. 561 of 717 also
Appellants Attached Exhibit #2 (afier plantings)).
It is further noted that the Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, planted the abovementioned spite trees and shrubs from a period of approximately fourteen (14) to
eighteen (18) years after the Respondents landscaping had been initially approved by the
Architectural Control Committee.
The Respondents "spite" plantings, along with the arborvitae hedge height issue,
has caused Appellant to suffer extreme property devaluation and diminution at the loss of
her highly valued view of the River, a primary reason Greenfield purchased her property.
In Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785 (Idaho 1973) "Under the modem
American rule, however, one may not erect a structure for the sole purpose of annoying
his neighbor. Many courts hold that a spite fence which serves no useful purpose may
give rise to an action for both injunctive relief and damages."

See 5 Powell, supra,

~

696, p. 277; IA Thompson on Real Property, § 239 (1964 ed.). "Many courts following
the above rule further characterize a spite fence as a nuisance." See Hornsby v. Smith,
191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439 (1909);
Annotation 133 A.L.R. 691; Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888).
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"Subsequently, many American jurisdictions have adopted and followed Burke so that it
is clearly the prevailing modern view." See Powell, supra,

il

696 at p. 279; Flaherty v.

Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N.W. 381 (1890); Barger v. Barringer, supra; Norton v.
Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912); Bush v. Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N.W.
1001 (1914); Hibbard v. Hallidav, 58 Okla. 244, 158 P. 1158 (1916); Parker v. Harvey,
164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935); Hornsby v. Smith, supra; Brittingham v. Robertson, 280
A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1971). See the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Rideout v. Knox, 148
Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889). "In Burke a property owner built two 11 ft. fences
blocking the light and air to his neighbors' windows. The fences served no useful purpose
to their owner and were erected solely because of his malice toward his neighbor."
See Austin v. BALD II, LLC, 658 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); "A spite fence

is one which is of no beneficial use to the owner and which is erected and maintained
solely for the purpose of annoying a neighbor." Welsh v. Todd, 260 N.C. 527, 528, 133
S.E.2d 171, 173 ( 1963 ).

"[A] fence erected maliciously and with no other purpose than

to shut out the light and air from a neighbor's window is a nuisance."

Barger v.

Barringer, 151 N.C. 433,434, 66 S.E. 439,439 (1909) (citing 12 Arn. & Eng. Enc., 1058,
and cases cited in note; 1 Cyc., 789). "It may be abated, subject to the same equitable
principles which govern injunctive relief generally, and damages recovered if any have
been sustained." Welsh, 260 N.C. at 528, 133 S.E.2d at 173 (citing Burris v. Creech, 220
N.C. 302, 17 S.E.2d 123 (1941)).
The record demonstrates that Respondents were on constructive notice to keep the
arborvitae hedge 'fence' (See Idaho Code §35-102 (5) LAWFUL FENCES DESCRIBED)
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trimmed to a maximum height of six (6) feet per the May 2006 written agreement
between both parties'.
Idaho State Code, City Ordinances, and CC&Rs mandate height restrictions on
fences, which include hedges, due to the fact that the natural fences will continue to grow
violating said codes, ordinances, and covenants if left unattended. Hedges have been
considered natural fences for decades, wherein State Code and City Ordinances
incorporate the word "Hedge" into the fence codes and / or ordinances to protect property
owners from neighboring property owners who may be attempting to circumvent the law
for their own self-interests.
According to Appellants arborist Joe Zubaly, the "Emerald Green arborvitae

shrub, a multi-stemmed plant, is a natural fence and this variety is used for privacy
fences all the time" (See Testimony of Arborists Zubaly Pg. 431, Lines 16-25, Pg. 437,
Lines 8-9, Pg. 451, Lines 20-25, Pg. 455, Lines 23-25, Pg. 456, Lines 5-8 and Appellants

Attached Exhibit #8).
Respondents deceitfully convinced the trial court that because the arborvitae
shrubs may grow to a height exceeding fifteen (15) feet, they should be classified as
trees. Yet by testimony, affidavits, and case documents, the Respondents and their expert
witnesses referred to the arborvitae as shrubs, plants, and / or bushes, NOT trees, in
multiple statements (See Pg. 457, Line 20-21, Pg. 458, Line 25, Pg. 459, Line 1, Lines

23-25, Pg. 460, Lines 21-22). The Respondents Master Arborist, Tim Kastning, referred
to the arborvitae as plants that are "generally referred to as shrubs" (See Pg. 44 line 7).
On April 25, 2012, Tim Kastning refers to the arborvitae as shrubs ten (10) times in his
written proposal (See Respondents Trial Exhibit #3). During his deposition, Mr. Kastning
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referred to the arborvitae as "shrubs" approximately thirty (30) times (See Kastning
Deposition pg. 25, lines 7, 12, pg. 28, lines 19, 24, 25, pg. 29, line 11, pg. 30, lines 10, 11,
pg. 31, lines 3, 8, 13, pg. 32, line 25, pg. 33, lines 7, 9, 11, pg. 37, lines 10, 15, 25, pg. 38,

lines 2, 14, 17, pg. 39, line 6, pg. 42, line 17, pg. 43, lines 4, 5,

~

line 7, pg. 46, line

11, pg. 50, lines 6, 11, pg. 52, line 1) (See also Clerks Record Pg. 531-532).

It is the belief of the Appellant that the only rational contemptible evaluation in
deducing why the Respondents would insist that the arborvitae shrubs should be labeled
as "trees", is to validate their derisive claim for "Timber Trespass."

Even if this Court

were to decide that the arborvitae are "trees", the argument is moot, as it would not deter
from the fact that a line of shrubs, bushes, plants, and / or trees that form a "hedge" is
considered to be a "fence", and may be abated as a nuisance (See Clerks Record Pgs.
533-535 Definitions Fences I Hedges).

Both Arborists testified that the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs were neither damaged
nor destroyed, but are healthy and thriving, mostly due to pruning. The fact that the
Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger cut the arborvitae hedge in 2006 claiming " .. .they were 7
to 12 feet high before I pruned them ..." (See Trial Testimony ofEric Wurmlinger Pg. 302,
Lines 10-20, Pg. 304, Lines 9-17) without damaging or destroying said hedge is evident

by the numerous photos that were submitted during trial proceedings ((See Appellants
Trial Exhibit #102 (A), Photo dated 2005 of hedge prior to Eric Wurmlinger cutting in
2006 and Appellants Trial Exhibit #25 showing partial arborvitae hedge two (2) years
after the 2006 cutting and Clerks Record Pg. 542). So is it logical to deduce that the

identical ten (10) arborvitae shrubs, previously cut by the Respondent, would be neither
damaged nor destroyed after the Appellants trimming, which was comparable in nature.
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In the Alberino v. Balch, 969 A.2d 61, 65 (Vt. 2008) case, the fence was more
visible from Balch's house than from Alberino who had erected the eight (8) foot tall
"Spite" fence to obstruct Balch's view of the river. "There are, however, also cases
holding that a fence with a primary purpose to annoy is also subject to abatement. The
cases are uniform in their approval of reliance on the history of relations between
neighbors as evidence of intent to annoy. See, e.g., Gertz v. Estes, 879 N.E.2d 617, 621
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) ("The parties' conduct and the extraordinary nature of the fence were
adequate to overcome [the] assertion that the eight-foot fence was intended to protect
eighteen-inch tree seedlings."). We need not decide which standard is required generally;
the factual backdrop here the photographs of the fence, the site visit, the contempt order
concerning the other fence in virtually the same location, and over fifteen years of
increasingly acrid disputes about dogs, brush piles, trespass, plowing, and noisesupports a finding that the fence was intended solely to annoy Balch by obstructing his
view and shading his property." "A Connecticut case cited by the trial court, DeCecco v.
Beach, 381 A.2d 543 (Conn. 1977), is also instructive.

In that case, the appellant-

landowner sought an injunction mandating that his neighbor remove four sections of a
ten-foot-high wooden fence that blocked the appellant's view of a river. After concluding
that there was support in the record for the trial court's conclusion that "malice was the
primary motive in [the fence's] erection," the court noted that "the fact that it also served
to protect the respondent's premises from observation must be regarded as only
incidental, since to hold otherwise would be to nullify the [spite-fence] statutes."
This is also true in this case where the arborvitae fence is more visible and
invasive to the Appellant and has no useful purpose to the Respondents. Respondents
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have minimal visibility on the Northwest side of their home facing Appellants property
except for two small windows, one on the second story, which is located approximately
twenty-five (25) feet from the ground, and the second smaller window located on the first
floor, both of which look directly northwest to the city park and rear of Appellant's lot
((See Appellants Trial Exhibit #102 (A) Window location). Evidence of this can be found
in Respondent, Eric Wurmlingers, trial testimony about the location of his surveillance
camera where he stated "That's a game camera and it's located on the west side of our
home looking at the -- our side yard toward Black Bay Park and back toward Black Bay
Park" (Trial Transcript Pg. 709, Lines 16-19).
Further, Balch testified that "the fence has curled so much that it encroaches on
his land, that it casts a shadow "halfway across [his] land," and that it "does not inhibit
sound at all."

Just as in this case the arborvitae fence encroaches onto Appellants

property up to approximately three or more feet, the uncontrolled height blocks the
coveted view of the river, and prevents sunlight onto Appellant's property.
The Court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in Alberino v. Balch
finding that the fence served "no objective purpose." See 24 V.S.A. § 3817 ("A person
shall not erect or maintain an unnecessary fence or other structure for the purpose of
annoying the owners of adjoining property by obstructing their view or depriving them of
light or air.").
In this case the Respondents have testified that they want privacy for their

"Guests" (not family members) who purchase overnight accommodations.

The

arborvitae hedge fence has no useful purpose in providing "privacy" for the "guest"
accommodations as said "guest" rooms are located on the bottom level of Respondents
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home, on the opposite side (south) of the property.

The mam floor "guest"

accommodation faces the front yard of the Respondents property. The hot tub, which is
located on the Respondents rear property line next to the park and is used by "guests", is
enclosed in a darkened gazebo, surrounded by foliage, wherein the arborvitae hedge does
not contribute any privacy for said hot tub. As for the "family" bedrooms, they too are
located on the opposite side (south) of the Respondents home with one exception, the
Respondents daughter currently utilizes the second floor bedroom that has a small
window that peers out onto the northwest side of the property overlooking the park and
rear boundary line of the Appellants property ((See Appellants Trial Exhibit #102 (A)).
Generally, a movant qualifies for injunctive relief by showing: ( 1) a probable
right ofrecovery; (2) imminent, irreparable harm will occur in the interim if the request is
denied.; and (3) no adequate remedy at law exists. Despite this general rule, however, a
movant seeking an injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant is not required to show
proof of irreparable injury. See Guajardo v. Neece, 758 S.W.2d 696,698 (Tex. App. Fort
Worth 1988, no writ). "Instead, the movant is only required to prove that the respondent
intends to do an act that would breach the covenant. As previously noted, appellees were
not required to show proof of irreparable injury because they were seeking an injunction
to enforce a restrictive covenant. See Guajardo v. Neece, 758 S.W.2d at 698."
C. Consolidating Issues (g)(h)(i)(n)(o)(p)(z) Survey, Nuisance, Abatement, Timber
Trespass, Trespass

When Appellant purchased her property in May 2005, Appellant hired Meckel
Engineering to conduct a survey on her property (See Trial Testimony Christina
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Greenfield, Pg. 538, Lines 17-19 and Clerks Record Pg. 516-524 o/717) to locate all of
her property lines and comers.
Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, also hired Inland Northwest Consultants to conduct
a survey on his property in May 2005, as Respondents were planning on building a large
addition to their home next to Appellant's property (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #109,
2010 Tax "Detail Report" for 2005 survey costs of $5055 and Appellants Attached
Exhibit #1). The Respondents surveyor located the northwest property comer and placed
two wooden survey hubs in the center of the parties' property line at the base of two
arborvitae shrubs, which were incorporated within the hedge row of ten (10) arborvitae
shrubs that were trimmed by both parties' (See Trial Testimony Christina Greenfield, f.&..
539, Lines 13-19).
By April 2006, Appellant had attempted to notify the Respondents that the top of
the arborvitae hedge needed to be trimmed to the five (5) foot height to adhere to the
PWP CC&Rs height restrictions for "Fences." The Respondents had not responded to
Greenfield's request, so Appellant contacted the City of Post Falls Zoning Department
seeking resolution. After contacting the Post Falls Code Enforcement Officer, Collin
Coles; it was decided that the city would send a letter to the Respondents regarding the
height restrictions in the city "fence" ordinance requiring that the arborvitae hedge must
be maintained at the six (6) foot height (See Appellant Trial Exhibit #12).
The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, eventually trimmed all of the existing twenty
four (24) arborvitae shrubs; the ten (10) west of the center Pine tree were trimmed to a
height of approximately six (6) feet and the remaining fourteen (14) arborvitae shrubs
east of the center pine tree were trimmed to a height of approximately nine (9) feet.
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Appellant informed the Post Falls Code Enforcement Officer that the Respondents were
not in full compliance. A second compliance letter was sent to the Respondents (See
Appellant Trial Exhibit # 14). Respondents ignored the letter, so Appellant hired attorney

Kacey Wall in May 2006, to draft a friendly "Cautionary" letter to the Respondents
identifying PWP CC&R violations, including the arborvitae hedge height restriction.
Respondent Eric Wurmlinger agreed that he would comply with the PWP CC&Rs
and he would maintain the arborvitae hedge at its current height, which Greenfield agreed
to, and no further action was taken (See Appellant Trial Exhibit #16, Pg. 2, Point #4).
ln June 2006, following the above-mentioned agreement, Respondent Eric
Wunnlinger planted two (2) large pine trees right next to the adjoining parties' property
line near the Appellants northwest corner that partially blocked her view of the river (See
Appellants Trial Exhibit # 102 (E) Photo of Pine Tree Next to Appellants Block Wall).

The arborvitae hedge continued to grow and began to block Appellant's view of
the river. It became apparent in Spring 2008 that the Respondents were disregarding their
agreement with Appellant to maintain the arborvitae hedge at the agreed upon height of
six (6) feet. The Respondent, Eric Wunnlinger planted an additional nine (9) arborvitae
to existing arborvitae hedge on May 6, 2008, to further block Appellants view of the river
(See Appellants Trial Exhibit #25).

Appellant sent a note to the Respondent, Eric

Wunnlinger, on May 26, 2008, (See Appellant Trial Exhibit #29) reminding him of their
agreement or Appellant would " ... hire someone to trim them" (arborvitae) (See Idaho
Code §35-111). Respondents ignored the Appellant's letter, so Appellant justly employed

her brother-in-law on April 1, 2010, (23 months later) to trim the ten (10) arborvitae
shrubs, previously cut by Respondent, Eric Wunnlinger, in April 2006 (See Trial
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Testimony of Monroe Greenfield, Pg. 483, Lines 11-15, Lines 20-25, Pg. 484, Lines 1-21,
Line 25, Pg. 485, Lines 1-4, Lines 8-25, Pg. 486, Lines 1-16, Lines 18-25, Pg. 478, Lines
2-17).

Greenfield had developed major health problems and was scheduled for major
surgery on April 29, 2010, wherein she would be recuperating for up to ten (10) weeks.
Greenfield specifically asked her brother-in-law, an experienced hedge trimmer, to trim
the arborvitae hedge, simply so she could enjoy her coveted view of the river while
recuperating from surgery.
Because the arborvitae had also become an overgrown Nuisance (See Idaho Code
§52-301) and was affecting Appellant in a damaging manner, Appellant is allowed by

Idaho Law to abate the nuisance without harming the arborvitae. (See Idaho Codes §35105, §55-312, §52-302, §52-303).

Both expert witnesses testified that the arborvitae

shrubs were neither damaged nor destroyed by the Appellant's trimming. See Larsen v.
Village of Lava Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64,396 P 2d. 471 (1964); Vanderpol v. Starr, 194
Cal. App. 4th 385 (2011).
Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, upon viewing the trimmed arborvitae notified the
Post Falls Police Department and alleged that Appellant, Greenfield had "Destroyed their
arborvitae ... " (See Idaho Code §18-2601). This falsehood caused Greenfield to undergo
weeks of interrogation from the Post Falls Police department, which led to a felony
charge, causing Greenfield severe emotional stress at work and home while recuperating
from surgery.
The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, had testified that the arborvitae shrubs he
"planted approximately ten years earlier as a border planting between our properties"
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(See Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 294, Lines 16-20, Pg. 305, Lines 5-25, Pg.
306, Lines 1-2). In Respondents Trial Brief (dated May 11, 2012, Pg.5, Paragraph 2(b),
under ARGUMENT), it states: "the arborvitae hedge had been present on the parties'

boundary line since 1995 and were between ten (10) and twelve (12) feet tall." The
Respondents Statement of Remaining Issues (dated November 8, 2012, ~ , Paragraph
2) states: "Do the arborvitae growing along the parties' property line constitute a

nuisance?" (fg,_2, Paragraph 4) states: "Do the arborvitae planted on or near the
property line between the arwellant :S and respondents' real property violate the Park
Wood Place CC&Rs?" It appears by statements and/ or testimony that the Respondents
believed that a mutual ownership of the arborvitae hedge also existed. See Holmberg v.
Bergin 172 N.W.2d 739 (1969); Herrmann v. Larson, 214 Minn. 46, 7 N.W.2d 330; Jovce
v. Village of Janesville, 132 Minn. 121, 155 N.W. 1067, L.R.A. 1916D, 426; Mead v.
Vincent, 199 Okl. 508, 187 P.2d 994; Lemon v. Curington, 78 Idaho 522,306 P.2d 1091,
64 A.L.R.2d 665; Shevlin v. Johnston, 56 Cal.App. 563, 205 P. 1087; Stevens v. Moon,
54 Cal.App. 737, 202 P. 961; Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 P. 298, 18 A.L.R.
650; Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296, 52 Am.Rep. 188.
Appellant may bring suit to abate the nuisance and to recover for damages done to
her property. See Mead v. Vincent, supra; Shevlin v. Johnston, supra; Stevens v. Moon,
supra; Gostina v. Ryland, supra.
"In Nuisance cases (Abatement is a Nuisance Issue), as in other cases involving
injunctive relief, the extent of the relief to be granted lies largely within the discretion of
the trial court, and our function on appeal is to determine whether such discretion has
been abused. See Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 1, 174 A.L.R. 746.
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This opinion cites: Cole v. Kunzler, 768 P.2d 815 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989), Ervin Const.
Co. v. Van Orden, 874 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1993), Everhart v. COUNTY ROAD AND
BRIDGE DEPT., 939 P.2d 849, Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 826 P.2d 1322 (Idaho
1992), Kuglerv. Drown, 809 P.2d 1166 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)."
"The law is clear that one cannot exercise his right to plant a tree in such a
manner as to invade the rights of adjoining landowners." See Vanderpol v. Starr, 194 Cal.
App. 4th 385 (2011 ). The evidence in this case shows that Respondents, by planting and
improperly maintaining the arborvitae hedge in question, are obstructing Appellant's free
use and enjoyment of her property. "When one brings a foreign substance on his land, he
must not permit it to injure his neighbor. Buckingham v. Elliott, supra; Mead v. Vincent,
supra; Stevens v. Moon, supra; Parker v. Larsen, 86 Cal. 236, 24 P. 989."
Respondents have cited no case holding that one adjoining landowner may plant a
tree on his boundary line, or in such a manner that it will grow across the boundary line,
thereby forcing an involuntary tenancy in common of the tree upon his neighbor under
which neither can remove or damage the tree without the consent of the other,
notwithstanding that such tree is damaging his neighbor's property.
During the course of litigation both parties hired additional surveyor's to locate
the exact location of the arborvitae shrubs in relationship to the parties' shared property
line. The Appellant's Survey, which commenced on August 31, 2011, (See Appellant's
Trial Exhibit #106) along with trial testimony by Licensed Surveyor, Dusty Obermayer,

indicate that the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs, that were trimmed by both parties, are located
on the shared property line (See Trial Testimony by Obermayer, Pg. 465, Lines 19-20, Pg.
466, Line 20, Pg. 467, Lines 3-24, Pg. 468, Lines 5-12, Lines 17-25, Pg. 469, Lines 1-6).
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The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, testified that he only had one survey of his
property completed (referring to the Monaco Survey) on October 14, 2011 (See Trial

Testimony Pg. 304, Lines 19-25, Pg. 305, Line 1-2), but court records say otherwise,
wherein Eric Wurmlinger hired Inland Northwest Consultants (INC) to perform a survey
on June 30, 2005 and December 16, 2010 (See Clerks Record Pg. 566-568).
The Post Falls Police Department Chief, Scot Haug and the Kootenai County
Prosecutor, Barry McHugh along with the Respondents Eric and Rosalyn Wurmlinger,
had all agreed (meeting at Kootenai County Prosecutors office on December 9, 2010, per

Post Falls Police Report, Appellants Trial Exhibit #49, Pg. 9 and Appellants Attached
Exhibit #6, Pg. 9) that a survey was mandatory to "verify the exact property line."
The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, initially paid the $450 fees to INC for said
survey and was later reimbursed by the City of Post Falls and the Kootenai County
Prosecutor (See Clerks Record Pgs. 566-568 and Trial Testimony of Detective Rodney

Gunderson Pg. 634, Lines 1-25, Pg. 635, Lines 1-13). Appellant observed the INC
survey crew mark several areas along the adjoining parties' property line with wooden
stakes that were placed in the middle of the arborvitae hedge (See Aoude v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989).
After said survey was performed, the Kootenai County Prosecutor amended the
felony charge against Greenfield on June 10, 2011 and again on July 11, 2011, by adding
the words "to wit: trees and I or shrubs, of a value in excess of One Thousand Dollars

($1000), the property of Eric Wurmlinger, and I or property which was iointly owned by
Eric Wurmlinger and the Respondent (Greenfield) ... "(See Appellant Trial Exhibit #82,
Clerks Record Pg. 581, Appellants Attached Exhibit #5). The Respondents constantly
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denied the existence of the December 16, 2010, survey and refused to turn over the
findings of said survey to the Appellant through multiple discovery requests.
Greenfield was acquitted of the bogus felony charge on October 4, 2011 (See

Appellant Trial Exhibit #83), and on October 14, 2011 (See Respondents Trial Exhibit
#B), ten (10) days later, the Respondents hired Jon Monaco to re-survey the previously
surveyed adjoining property line. Since the Respondents had denied the existence of the
December 16, 2010 survey during testimony, they could not utilize the findings of said
nonexistent survey, as the Respondents would be guilty of perjury.
Appellant believes that the reason behind Respondents decision to repudiate the
survey, was because said survey showed that the location of the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs
that Appellants agent had trimmed, were planted on the property line of both parties and
mutual ownership existed (See Trial Testimony of Rodney Gunderson Pg. 649, Lines 20-

25) This information could have prevented Greenfield from suffering an additional nine
(9) months awaiting trial for a spurious crime, of which she was eventually acquitted.
It is disconcerting to the Appellant that the Respondents surveyor, Jon Monaco,
testified that he DID NOT measure the base of the arborvitae shrubs as to their placement
on the parties shared property line, yet the Respondents survey displayed tiny black dots
that allegedly represented each of the arborvitae shrubs location along the parties' shared
property line (See Deposition by Monaco Pg. 30, Lines 21-25, Pg. 31, Lines 5-12).
Furthermore, Jon Monaco misstates the number of arborvitae shrubs, claiming
there are thirty four (34), when in fact there are thirty three (33) arborvitae shrubs.
Monaco also misrepresents the fact by stating that seventeen (17) arborvitae shrubs were
trimmed when in fact only ten (10) arborvitae shrubs were trimmed by Appellant's agent.
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Another puzzling element of Jon Monaco's survey, is that it specifies "Site Survey of lot
7 and part of Lot 8." Respondents' own lot 7 and Appellant owns lot 6. Who owns lot 8?
With so many discrepancies, one wonders if Jon Monaco actually performed a survey and
on which lots?
Clearly, the Respondents survey is irrelevant and non-conclusive as to the exact
location of the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs. After Jon Monaco submits the unsupported
survey, the Respondents Amend their Counter Claims by adding the 'Timber Trespass'
Claim just ten (10) days after Greenfield was acquitted of the felony charge. The fact that
Jon Monaco, a licensed surveyor with thirty (30) years' experience and owner of "Empire
Surveying", testified that he knows the Idaho State Law in regard to licensed surveyors,
but DID NOT validate his findings by signing said survey (See Idaho Code §54-1215)
only makes the Appellant more suspicious of duplicitous behavior on behalf of both the
Respondents and Jon Monaco.

It is further noted that Appellant objected to the

submission of the Monaco Survey during trial proceedings (See Appellants Attached

Exhibit #3, Trial Minutes from 2:39:39

2:40:14 PM on November 29, 2012).

""A "fraud on the court" occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and
convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme
calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter
by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing
party's claim or defense. See e.g., Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th
Cir.1989); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir.1976);
England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir.1960); United Business Communications,
Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1172, 1186-87 (D.Kan.1984); United States v. ITT
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Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 29 (D.Conn.1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 919, 93 S. Ct. 1363, 35
L.Ed.2d 582 (1973)."" "In our view, this gross misbehavior constituted fraud on the
court. See Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 986 (4th
Cir.1987) (fraud on court may exist where witness and attorney conspire to present
periured testimony); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir.1978)
(same, where party. with counsel's collusion, fabricates evidence)."

This Court must also consider the fact that both the Respondents and Appellants
properties butt up against the City of Post Falls 'Black Bay' and public Park, which is
open year round to the public. The PWP subdivision was developed along the river and
park, wherein privacy is not an option when living in close proximity to said amenities.
The Respondents have NOT enclosed any of their property by any other fences,
hedges, screens, or structures of the like, other than the thirty three (3 3) arborvitae shrubs
and spite trees on / or near the parties' adjoining property line (See Respondents Trial
Exhibit #DD (1 ), Photos of spite trees and Exhibit #KK of Respondents Front yard).

D. Respondents Dismissal of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (k)
The Respondents filed Counter Claims against Appellant for Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress (I.I.E.D.) and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (N.I.E.D.)
on October 21, 2010 ((See Clerks Record Pg. 47 (7)). Respondents then asked the Court
to dismiss their N.I.E.D. claim and were granted said dismissal with prejudice on March
22, 2011 (See Clerks Record Pg. 58). The Respondents then attempted to deceptively
introduce the N.I.E.D. claim back into Trial proceedings on November 29, 2012,
approximately twenty (20) months after said N.I.E.D. claim was dismissed with prejudice
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by Judge Haynes. Respondents DID NOT utilize their claim for I.I.E.D. during trial
proceedings, nor did they instruct the jury for said claim under 'Timber Trespass.'
For Greenfield to be guilty of 'Timber Trespass' under Idaho Code §6-202, she
must have acted willfully and intentionally. See Kenneth J. Good v. Larry W. Sichelstiel,
(Idaho Ct. App. 2012). Greenfield had been acquitted of the felony charge for trimming
the arborvitae shrubs due to the fact that the State did not have any evidence that
Greenfield acted willfully and intentionally in trimming the arborvitaes shrubs (See
Appellant Trial Exhibit #83, Acquittal).

It is further noted that the Respondents 'Statement of Remaining Facts' dated
November 8, 2012, submitted just twenty-one (21) days prior to Trial, DID NOT include
the N.I.E.D. Claim in their statement of facts (See Clerks Record Pgs. 184-186 o/717).
The Respondents are barred from bringing an action on the same claim.
Dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment and the case becomes res judicata on the
claims that were or could have been brought in it.
E. Appellants Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (I)

The Appellant had attempted to resolve all of Respondents CC&R violations
through legal representation in May 2006, and considered all matters moot at that time.
However, the Respondents continued to aggressively harass the Appellant by
engaging in combative maneuvers such as; 1.) trespassing on Appellants property (See
Clerks Record Pgs. 133-135, Pg. 137-138. and Trial Testimony of Appellant Pg. 550.
Lines 12-16); 2.) installing surveillance cameras aimed at Appellants property (See
Appellants Trial Exhibit #102); 3.) moving Appellants personal property; 4.) making false

allegations to law enforcement approximately twenty times, including having the
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Appellant charged with a misdemeanor trespass in 2008 (dismissed) (See Clerks Record,
Pg. 135 (44)) and a felony in 2010 (acquittal); 5.) Appellants garbage was seized and

searched; and 6.) endangering the Appellants life on one occasion when the Respondents
called 911 and reported that a "prowler" was lurking in Appellants back yard, when in
fact Appellant was watering her garden. The Appellant was surrounded by local law
enforcement revealing weapons (See Clerks Record, Pg. 137 (51) and Trial Testimony of
Appellant Christina Greenfield Pg. 553, Lines 12-24, Pg. 554, Lines 20-24).

Due to the negative actions of the Respondents, Appellant was constantly under
surveillance by local law enforcement and had the contents of her garbage seized
purportedly to find evidence of alleged crimes (See Trial Testimony of Appellant
Christina Greenfield)

When Respondents noticed that the arborvitae shrubs had been trimmed in April
2010, they contacted law enforcement and made false statements alleging that they had
been the victims of a crime (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #49).

The Respondents

allegations were "FALSE" and were made intentionally and / or recklessly to harm
Greenfield.
On June 18, 2010, Greenfield, while at home on medical leave recuperating from
major surgery, was served a summons (Dated June 3, 2010) by Kootenai County Sheriff
Mike Douglas, who demanded that Greenfield go immediately to the Kootenai County
Sheriff's building to get fingerprinted or a "Bench Warrant" for her arrest would be
initiated, as she had been officially charged with "Felony Malicious Injury to Property"
When Greenfield arrived at the Kootenai County Sherriff's building, Greenfield
was informed that she needed to proceed directly to the "Jail."
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A female guard

approached Greenfield and handcuffed her hands behind her back. Greenfield began
uncontrollably sobbing, petrified at what would transpire next.

Appellant was in

excruciating pain, as her hands were bound tightly behind her back in handcuffs, which
were stretching her abdomen region where Greenfield had an eight (8) inch incision,
extreme bruising, and multiple sutures from her recent surgery. Greenfield explained to
the guard that she had surgery and was in a great deal of pain from standing and the
position of the handcuffs. Greenfield asked the guard to lift her shirt and see where the
incision was located so the guard would not cause Greenfield irreparable damage and
additional trauma to the incision area during the search (See Trial Testimony of Appellant
Christina Greenfield Pg. 542, Lines 10-25).

Greenfield was forced to sit in a hard metal chair for hours while being processed
for a felony, which included fingerprinting and "Mug Shots." Greenfield felt extremely
violated, distraught, and nauseated at this point. Greenfield alerted the guard that she was
not feeling well and in a great deal of pain. After approximately five (5) hours of
excruciating pain and humiliation, Greenfield was finally released (See Trial Testimony of
Appellant Christina Greenfield Pg. 543, Lines 9-17).

The Appellant chooses to exercise her legal right to abatement pursuant to Idaho
Code §52-302, wherein a "person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing,

or, if necessary. destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance ... " and is
subsequently arrested and accused of committing a felony injury to property all at the
request of the Respondents. The removal (trimming of arborvitae hedge) of the nuisance
(hedge in excess of the height requirement that obstructed a premium "view" river front
property) was not a breach of the peace or injury to Respondents. To make matters

APPELLANT BRIEF

41

worse, Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, contacted KXLY News and the local newspapers to
persecute the Appellant as a "Hedge Hacker" defaming her good name and distorting the
truth to the media (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #JOO).
The Appellant was further victimized, wherein she was fired from her lucrative
employment as a Senior Personal Banker with Bank of America (a criminal background
checked secured banking position) on September 2, 2010, due to the felony charge and
the multiple mandatory court appearances. Greenfield was unable to find employment
for the nineteen (19) months prior to her acquitted of the spurious charge, was unable to
pay her bills, causing her credit score to plummet and was forced to file for bankruptcy.
Greenfield also lost her "Bonding" ability, a crucial element in procuring employment in
her field of expertise. See Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682 P.2d 1282 (1984); Spence
v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995); Payne v. Wallace, 136 ldaho 303, 32 P.3d
695 (2001); Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 ldaho 830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990).
Greenfield suffers from severe emotional distress and health issues due to the
constant intentional negligent actions and harassment from the Respondents over a span
of eight years.
In Appellants Amended Trial Brief, Appellant listed health issues due to the stress
from Respondents constant harassment: On March 8, 2006, Greenfield was diagnosed
with Erythema Nodosum ((See Clerks Record Pg.128(2O)); On June 26, 2007, Greenfield
went to Kootenai Hospital for ultrasound testing for pain and swelling ((See Clerks
Record Pg.I 33(35)); On February 12, 2009, Greenfield went to the Dime Clinic as she

was experiencing severe chest-pain ((See Clerks Record Pg.141 (58)); On March 3, 2009,
Greenfield saw Dr. Fritz for a heart stress test ((See Clerks Record Pg.141(59)); On
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March 13,2009, Greenfield saw Dr. Ambrose as she was experiencing fatigue and female
issues were elevated from stress. Greenfield was anemic and underwent an emergency
medical procedure called a DNC ((See Clerks Record Pg.141(60)); On April 16, 2009,
Greenfield saw Dr. Abate for heart related issues caused by stress and anxiety that she
was experiencing ((See Clerks Record Pg.141(61)); On August 27, 2009, Greenfield went
to Dime Clinic for fatigue, stress and anxiety related health issues. Blood test were done
and Greenfield was diagnosed with anemia ((See Clerks Record Pg.142(66)); On October
3, 2009, Greenfield went to Dime Clinic with heart related issues ((See Clerks Record
Pg.142(67)); On February 11, 2010, Greenfield visited Dr. Ambrose to evaluate health

concerns. Lab-tests were performed ((See Clerks Record Pg.143(68)); On February 20,
2010, Greenfield visited Dr. Ambrose to evaluate health concerns with upcoming surgery

((See Clerks Record Pg.143(69)); On February 22, 2010, Greenfield visited Dr. Ambrose
to evaluate heart related issues with upcoming surgery ((See Clerks Record Pg.143(70));
On February 23, 2010, Greenfield was admitted to Kootenai Hospital for a medical
procedure to be performed by Dr. Ambrose ((See Clerks Record Pg.143(71)); Due to
heart related issues, surgery was not completed and rescheduled for a later date to be
determined, which said medical procedure occurred on April 29, 2010 ((See Clerks

Record Pg.144(78)); On September 8, 2011, Greenfield was rushed to the emergency
room, while visiting her daughter in Colorado, with heart related issues ((See Clerks

Record Pg.149 (95)). Appellant began weekly counseling sessions to cope with her
debilitating emotional distress and depression in January 2011, and continuing through
the present. Appellant continues to suffer from physical manifestations requiring medical
attention.
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Although Judge Haynes dismissed Appellants claim for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, Appellant suffers from the associated elements described herein of
said intentional and negligent distress; "An action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress will lie only where there is extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe
emotional distress. Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d
944 ( 1980). The Arizona Court of Appeals put it this way:

"There are four elements which must coincide to impose liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress: (1) conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the
conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between
the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress must be
severe.
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental
reactions, such as fright horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin.
disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is reasonable to believe that the Respondents had a
motive to do harm to Appellant by deceptively submitting photographs to law
enforcement (See Idaho Code § 18-2603) in April 2010, that indicated the arborvitae
hedge height was approximately twelve (12) feet high, when in fact they ranged between
six and one half (6 ½) to nine and one half (9 ½) feet tall when Appellants agent trimmed
said arborvitae. Respondents did not inform law enforcement that the arborvitae shrubs
were planted along the property line and a prior agreement to maintain the arborvitae
hedge at a specified height had been conveyed by Respondents and Appellant in May
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2006. The Respondents were hoping for a conviction to get rid of Greenfield through any
devious method and / or propaganda they could cultivate.
Greenfield suffered through nineteen (19) months of excruciating torture not
knowing if she was going to be convicted of a felony for merely trimming ten (10)
arborvitae shrubs. Greenfield, a fifty-six (56) year old grandmother, has never been
arrested or convicted of any crimes prior to the fabricated felony charge. Greenfield had
to refinance her home at a higher rate for a much longer term, sell a majority of her
personal belongings, borrowed from relatives, file for bankruptcy and apply for food
stamps to survive while waiting for trial and compensating her defense attorney.
Greenfield developed life-threatening medical issues; including heart issues, and
tumors, along with debilitating panic attacks, severe rashes, sleeplessness, excruciating
headaches, nervousness, and fell into a deep depression, wherein she was isolated from
family and friends.
When considering the emotional distress caused to Greenfield, not only should the
Appellant be awarded N.I.E.D. damages, but punitive damages as well, due to the
Respondents disturbing behavior toward the Appellant. "An award of punitive damages
is first within the province of the trier of fact, subject to review for abuse of discretion.
Cheney v. Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983). That
discretion is to be exercised within the "general advisory guidelines" laid down in the
past, see id. at 905,665 P.2d at 669, but an award will be sustained only when it is shown
that the act was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the
act was performed by the respondent with an understanding of or a disregard for its likely
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consequences (in the words of prior cases. with fraud, malice or oppression)." Linscott v.
Rainier National Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980).
The Respondents sedulous harassment was induced each and every time after
Appellant utilized her legal right to bring the Respondents into compliance with the PWP
CC&Rs and City Ordinances.

F. Consolidating Issues (m)(y) Jury Instructions
On October 29, 2012, Judge Haynes Pre-Trial Order stated that all parties' "shall

submit their Jury Instructions no later than 5:00 PM on November 16, 2012" ((See
Clerks Record Pg. 183(2)). The Appellant had timely submitted all of her jury
instructions per Judge Haynes Order by said deadline. Judge Haynes DENIED all of the
Appellants jury instructions and direct verdict form (See Appellants Attached Exhibit #7).
Appellant did not receive the new jury instructions until 2:11 PM on November 30, 2012,
the last day of trial (See Trial Transcript Pg.965, Lines 9-11, Lines 16-18). Appellant
objected to the format of the new direct verdict form, stating that it may confuse the jury
on the claims.
A challenge to the adequacy of jury instructions presents a question of law over
which this Court exercises free review.

State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647, 962 P.2d

1026, 1031 (1998); State v. Harris, 136 Idaho 484,485, 36 P.3d 836, 837 (Ct.App.2001).
This requires that we determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and
accurately state the applicable law. State v. Keaveny, 136 Idaho 31, 33, 28 P.3d 372, 374
(2001); Harris, 136 Idaho at 485, 36 P.3d at 837.
Judge Haynes had dismissed the Respondents Claim for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress with Prejudice in March 2011 (See Hearing Transcript dated March
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17, 2011, Pg. 61, Lines 7-9), yet Haynes allowed Jury Instruction #14 and #24 (See
Clerks Record Pg. 238), which pertained to said dismissed N.I.E.D. Claim.
Appellant requested that Jury Question # 18 should be separated into two parts as
well: "Did appellant damage or destroy respondents' arborvitae and/or spruce tree?"
Jury Instruction #21 is confusing and has no bearing in this case.
There were NO Jury Instructions given on Appellants Claims m regard to:
"Breach of Contract" and Idaho "Fence" Law.
There were NO Jury Instructions given referencing the Respondents Claim for
"Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" and there is NO record of the Respondents
requesting to omit said claim from their Defense.
The Direct Verdict Form referred once more in #9 to Respondents dismissed
N.I.E.D. Claim: "Did the appellant's general conduct negligently inflict emotional

distress on the respondents?"
Appellant contends that Judge Haynes did not sufficiently denote the meaning of
the Idaho Code §6-202 regarding "Trespass" by omitting several key components of said
statute in Jury Instructions #15, #16, #18, and #19 (See Clerks Record Pgs. 239, 242,

243). For example; there is no mention of the term 'arborvitae', but instead the term
'tree' is utilized in Idaho Code §6-202, yet instruction #18 references 'arborvitae' and
instruction #19 'tree' is referenced and not 'arborvitae'.

Why did Judge Haynes find it

necessary to divide the meaning of the statute into three separate Jury Instructions and
equate the word 'tree' and 'arborvitae' in one instruction and not the other, unless to
confuse the jury. The Jury did question the 'Timber Trespass' verbiage and clarification
was requested (See Appellant Attached Exhibit #4).
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It is further noted that the Respondents stated a claim for "Timber Trespass",

which pertains to a criminal action under Idaho Code §18-7008. Greenfield had been
acquitted of Malicious Injury to Property, including trespass, which is encompassed in the
Idaho Code §18-7008 for Trespass and Malicious Injuries to Property.
See Austin; "When a party's requested jury instruction is correct and supported by

the evidence, the trial court is required to give the instruction." Maglione v. Aegis Family
Health Ctrs., 168 N.C.App. 49, 55, 607 S.E.2d 286, 291 (2005) (quoting Whiteside
Estates, Inc. v. Highlands Cove, L.L.C., 146 N.C.App. 449, 464, 553 S.E.2d 431, 441
(2001)). "In reviewing the trial court's decision to give or not give a jury instruction, the
preliminary inquiry is whether, in the light most favorable to the proponent, the evidence
presented is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of the elements of the claim
asserted." Blum v. Worley, 121 N.C.App. 166, 168, 465 S.E.2d 16, 18 (1995) (citing
Anderson v. Austin, 115 N.C.App. 134, 443 S.E.2d 737, 739 (1994)). "Once a party has
aptly tendered a request for a specific instruction, correct in itself and supported by the
evidence, failure of the trial court to render such instruction, in substance at least, is
error." Worley, 121 N.C.App. at 168,465 S.E.2d at 18 (citing Faeber v. E.C.T. Corp., 16
N.C.App. 429,430, 192 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1972)).

"[I]t is the duty of the trial court to charge

the law applicable to the substantive features of the case arising on the evidence and to
apply the law to the various factual situations presented by the conflicting evidence."
Faeber, 16 N.C.App. at 430, 192 S.E.2d at 2.
"Whenever the latest edition of the Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI) contains an
instruction applicable to the case and the court determines that the jury should be
instructed on the issue, it is recommended that the judge use the IDJI instruction unless
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the judge finds that a different instruction would more adequately, accurately or clearly
state the law I.R.C.P. 5l(a)(2). Use of the IDJI is not mandatory, only recommended.
Needs v. Hebener, 118 Idaho 438, 442, 797 P.2d 146, 150 (Ct.App.1990).

However, any

court that chooses to vary from a jury instruction previously approved by the Idaho
Supreme Court, does so with the risk that the verdict rendered may be overturned on
appeal. See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 64 7, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). While it
clearly is not error to modify an IDJI instruction, such modification will constitute error if
the modified instruction does not conform to the state of the law or omits elements basic
to the case. Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 111, 794 P.2d 1381, 1384
(1990). Schaefer v. Ready, 3 P. 3d 56 - 2000."
Appellate courts exercise free review over the question of whether a jury has been
properly instructed.

We must review the jury instructions given and ascertain whether,

when considered as a whole, they fairly and adequately present the issues of the case and
state the applicable law.

DeGraff v. Wight, 130 Idaho 577, 579, 944 P.2d 712, 714

(1997); Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 76, 910 P.2d 744, 748 (1996).
G. Consolidating Issues (q)(t) Constitutional Rights

"In construing a restrictive covenant, a court's primary task is to determine the intent
of the framers of the restrictive covenant. See Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 658
(Tex.1987). In determining this intent, the court must liberally construe the covenant's
language and must ensure that every provision is given effect. If there is ambiguity or
doubt as to the intent, the covenant is to be strictly construed against the party seeking to
enforce it in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises."
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In this case there is NO AMBIGUITY (information, in words, pictures, or other
media, is the ability to express more than one interpretation) as the PWP CC&Rs reads
"NO BUSINESS IS ALLOWED." The River Cove Bed and Breakfast is a commercial,
profitable business (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #109, Respondents Tax Records), open
twelve (12) months of the year, which offers several suites, boat cruises, and a wedding
facility to the public via internet and multiple advertising agents across the globe.
Idaho recognizes the validity of covenants that restrict the use of private property.
Nordstrom v. Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 345, 17 P.3d 287, 290 (2000) (citing Brown v.
Perkins. 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434, 437 (1996)). "When interpreting such
covenants, the Court generally applies the rules of contract construction. Id. However,
because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the common law right to use land for
all lawful purposes, the Court will not extend by implication any restriction not clearly
expressed. Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 473, 475, 873 P.2d 118, 120 (citing Thomas v.
Campbell, I 07 Idaho 398, 404, 690 P.2d 333, 339 (1984)). ""In applying the rules of
contract construction, the court analyzes the document in two steps. Beginning with the
plain language of the covenant, the first step is to determine whether or not there is an
ambiguity. See Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193, 923 P.2d at 438 (citing City of
Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201,899 P.2d 411,414 (1995)). "Words
or phrases that have established definitions in common use or settled legal are not
rendered ambiguous merely because they are not defined in the document where they are
used." City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho at 201, 899 P.2d at 414. Rather,
a covenant is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation on
a given issue. Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d at 120 (citing Rutter v.
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McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135 (1980)). Ambiguity is a question of law
subject to plenary review. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 192, 923 P.2d at 437. To
determine whether or not a covenant is ambiguous, the court must view the agreement as
a whole. Id. at 193, 923 P.2d at 437.""
m'The second step in contract or covenant construction depends on whether or not
an ambiguity has been found. If the covenants are unambiguous, then the court must
apply them as a matter of law. See City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho at
201, 899 P.2d at 414. "Where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction;
the plain meaning governs."

Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d at 120.

Conversely, if there is an ambiguity in the covenants, then interpretation is a question of
fact, and the Court must determine the intent of the parties at the time the instrument was
drafted. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193, 923 P.2d at 438. To determine the drafters'
intent, the Court looks to "the language of the covenants, the existing circumstances at
the time of the formulation of the covenants, and the conduct of the parties.""
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified four types
of unreasonable factual determinations in state court proceedings: (1) when state courts
fail to make a finding of fact; (2) when state courts mistakenly make factual findings
under the wrong legal standard; (3) when "the fact-finding process itself is defective"; or
(4) when state courts "plainly misapprehend or misstate the record in making their
findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to
petitioner's claim." See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d. 992, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2004).
Appellant list the following due process issues: 1.) Judge Haynes allowed Appellants
attorney to quit within eight (8) weeks prior to trial, leaving Appellant vulnerable for bias
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and prejudice. Appellant informed the judge that trial deadlines had passed and that she
could not afford another attorney; 2.) Judge Haynes should have insisted on a site
evaluation so the jury could visually see the condition of the arborvitae, the property layout of the homes and proximity of where the river, park, and homes were located in
relationship to one another; 3.) Judge Haynes did not allow Appellants timely disclosed
witness Leonard Benes to testify on behalf of Appellant, a crucial factor to the Appellants
defense (See Trial Transcript Pg.963, Lines 12-13); 4.) Judge Haynes allowed the
Respondents to submit evidence at trial that was never disclosed to Appellant and was in
violation of the November 8, 2012, deadline per Court Order (See Clerks Record Pg. 201,
Paragraph #2, and Pg. 202); 5.) Judge Haynes allowed the Jury Instructions to be altered

from their original state as quoted within the Idaho Codes; 6.) Judge Haynes did not grant
Injunctions to Appellant for Abatement and PWP CC&R violations as requested.
""The Court as the finder of fact may conduct a site visit or other analogous
inspection, and may "base its findings upon such examination together with all the
evidence in the case." See Daigle v. Conley, 121 Vt. 305, 309, 155 A.2d 744, 748 (1959)
(emphasis added); see also In re Quechee Lakes Corp., 154 Vt. 543, 551-52, 580 A.2d
957, 962 (1990) (administrative fact-finder may rely to same extent as trial judge on
knowledge gained from a site visit); Cass-Warner Corp. v. Brickman, 126 Vt. 329, 336,
229 A.2d 309, 314 (1967) (affirming verdict based in part on court's view of allegedly
defective bulkhead); McAndrews v. Leonard, 99 Vt. 512, 521, 134 A. 710, 714 (1926)
(upholding jury verdict based in part on jury's inspection of tort appellant's allegedly
injured skull, holding that "the jury had a right to base their verdict upon such
examination together with all the evidence in the case")."" The Court cannot visually
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comprehend a distorted image on paper (Respondents Trial Exhibit #CC), which is used
to illustrate where the river, park, hedge, and homes are located in relationship to each
other in the PWP subdivision, when deciding this case (See Trial Testimony of Appellant
Christina Greenfield Pg. 586, Lines 15-25, Pg. 587, Lines 1-7).

Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it determined a row of thirty
three (3 3) trees (arborvitae shrubs) in their natural state that formed a hedge, was not a
fence or other structure in the nature of a fence, as so intended within the meaning of the
unambiguous PWP CC&Rs.
It is for the trial court in the first instance to make the necessary factual findings,

based on the evidence received at trial, to determine whether the row of trees (arborvitae)
in this case satisfies all of the elements of a spite fence. See Wilson v. Handley, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 263,267 (Ct. App. 2002)
The facts are clear that States and Cities alike purposely control the height of
fences and like structures to a six (6) foot height and regulate zoning laws for purposes of
protecting land owners from abusive contemptuous property owners who do not want to
adhere to regulatory law.
The Respondents admitted to having knowledge of the PWP CC&Rs and they
chose to violate said CC&Rs.
H. Consolidating Issues (r)(s) Respondents Award of Attorney Fees

The Appellant has reasonable cause to believe that Respondents have violated the
law under the "un-clean hands" doctrine, wherein they deceptively corrupted the Court
by submitting falsified testimony and evidence into trial. See Campbell v. Kildew, 141
Idaho 640, 648, 115 P.3d 731 (2005). This contaminated so-called evidence (Survey,
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N.I.E.D. Claim) cannot sustain the verdict that was rendered and should not entitle
Respondents to recover any damages and / or sums in this cause.

See Russell v.

Chamberlain, 12 Ida. 299, 303, 9 Ann. Cas. 1173, 85 Pac. 926; Potter v. Seattle, 8 Cal.
217,221; Grant v. Moore, 29 Cal. 644, 656; Anderson v. Coleman, 53 Cal. 188; Vesper
v. Crane Co., 165 Cal. 36, 130 Pac. 876, L. R. A. 1915A, 541.
The district court awarded damages in the amount of $168,000 (See Clerks

Record Pgs. 675-67Q] to Respondents pursuant to erroneous interpretations of the law
regarding Idaho Code §6-202. Appellant should not be expected to pay for damages that
never occurred on property that she jointly owns. For argument purposes, even if the
arborvitae shrubs were all located on the Respondents property, said property was never
defined with "No Trespass" signs, and there was no intent by the Appellant to destroy or
damage said arborvitae, both contributing factors in finding guilt, per Idaho Code. If this
were the case, the Appellant would have been found guilty under the alleged felony
charge for essentially the same offense, of which she was acquitted.
The Respondents interpretation of the word "Tree" was so absurd that any scholar
would wince at the epilogue used to persuade the jury that a shrub can become a tree
simply because it may grow to a height of fifteen (15) feet. Ridiculous!
For example purposes, the following shrubs, plants, and / or bushes; Lilac bush,

Perfume Bush, Giant Milkweed Bush, Golden Dewdrop, Cherry Laurel, Gibb's Firethorn,
Japanese Holly Sky Pencil, and the Emerald Green arborvitae, just to name a few, have
the ability to grow to a height of fifteen ( 15) feet, have multiple stems, yet they remain
labeled as a bush, plant or shrub. Appellant does not have personal knowledge or any
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expert opinions on the matter regarding the harvesting of these varieties for their
"Timber" value.
The trial court based its judgment award upon the market value of the alleged
damaged and / or destroyed trees (arborvitae shrubs) as merchantable timber under Idaho
Code §6-202 for Timber Trespass, and evidence demonstrated that the trees (arborvitae
shrubs) were not cultivated for such use, but instead utilized as a screen (fence), which
violated the PWP CC&Rs and they were neither damaged nor destroyed as testified by
both arborists.

There was NO aesthetic value, as the arborvitae shrubs were NOT

damaged or destroyed, and there was no devaluation of property value due to the natural
trimming.
The Respondents convoluted the action brought by the Appellant after submitting
claims that they later dismissed (Tortious Interference with Economic Advantage and
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress), then resubmitting a new claim thirteen
months later for Timber Trespass, just fourteen (14) days after the Appellant was
acquitted of a bogus crime for Malicious Injury to Property.
Much of the Respondents trial evidence was offered just prior to / or at trial (late
disclosure) and has absolutely nothing to do with their claims, but rather irrational
assumptions after the fact (Pictures of alleged vandalism after the fact, pictures of
neighboring arborvitae shrubs, a distorted aerial view, a hand drawn alleged site plan
with no dimensions, and various unsubstantiated hearsay testimony).
The Respondents repeatedly ignored Court Orders by not responding to discovery
requests, which Appellant was eventually awarded Sanctions and attorney fees (See
Transcript Pg. 76, Lines I 7-25).
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Respondents attorneys of record caused further frustration and monetary damage to
Appellant, wherein Appellants attorney fees quadrupled. Appellant believes that the
blatant disregard for court proceedings was due to the fact that the Respondents court
costs were covered by their Commercial Business Insurance Binder Policy (Per
Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger), which covered the Respondents attorney fees and related

costs on counterclaims and defense.
There is no evidence to prove that the Wurmlingers suffered any mental or
physical manifestations for emotional distress as to the Appellants alleged conduct. See
Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Venerias v. Johnson, 622 P.2d 55
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).

The Respondents could not verify that they suffered any

emotional distress by offering such evidence, as medical evaluations or the contrary.
Respondent Eric Wurmlinger testified that he did not have any physical, mental, or
medical conditions from emotional distress stating " .. .I have not gone to the doctor" (See
Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger Pg. 837, Lines 8-17) Rosalyn Wurmlinger testified

that she had flu like symptoms, but never saw a doctor. If Respondents symptoms were
that serious, they would have sought medical treatment and / or counseling (See Trial
Testimony of Rosalyn Wurmlinger Pg. 939, Lines 8-19, Pg. 954, Lines 2-7, Lines 11-14).

As mentioned above in testimony, it was the Respondents who repeatedly reported to law
enforcement that the Appellant was guilty of alleged crimes, therefore causing extreme
emotional distress to the Appellant, unless the Respondents are claiming that their bad
behavior was causing their own stress?
"In the case of Board of County Commissioners of Weld County v. Slovek, 723
P.2d 1309, 1315 (Colo. 1986), the Colorado Supreme Court warned that the trial court
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must undertake careful evaluation when allowing an injured party to recover costs of
restoration that are greater than the diminution in market value because of the possibility
that the injured party will receive a monetary windfall. See Weitz, 148 Idaho at 866, 230
P.3d at 758."
Individuals may value land for specific and personal reasons, and in such
instances, justice requires that an award of damages restore such property owners to the
position they enjoyed prior to the damage. The Respondents suffered no damage as the
ten (10) arborvitae shrubs were previously cut by the Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, in
May 2006, then trimmed to the same height a second time in April 2010 by the
Appellant's agent. Appellant, however, lost her coveted view of the river due to malice
by the Respondents, who should not be rewarded for their fraudulent behavior in offering
tainted evidence, duplicitous documents, lately disclosed evidence, and false testimony.
See Aoude. ""We find the caselaw fully consonant with the view that a federal

district judge can order dismissal or default where a litigant has stooped to the level of
fraud on the court. The Supreme Court said so in Hazel-Atlas, albeit in dicta. Id. at 250,
64 S. Ct. at 1003. The most closely analogous cases we can find, in our own circuit and in
a variety of other courts, stand for much the same proposition. See, e.g., Brockton
Savings Bank, 771 F.2d at 11-12 (affirming district court's entry of default judgment
under court's inherent powers in response to defendant's abusive litigation practices);
Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir.1983) ("courts have
inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has willfully deceived the court and
engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice"); Eppes
v. Snowden, 656 F.Supp. 1267, 1279 (E.D.Ky.1986) (where fraud committed, court has
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"inherent power [to dismiss] ... to protect the integrity of its proceedings"); United States
v. Moss-American, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 214,216 (E.D.Wis.1978) (similar); C.B.H. Resources,
Inc. v. Mars Forging Co., 98 F.R.D. 564, 569 (W.D.Pa.1983) (dismissing under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41 (b) where party's fraudulent scheme, including use of a bogus subpoena, was
"totally at odds with ... the notions of fairness central to our system of litigation"). In
most of these cases, we hasten to add, the challenged conduct seems, arguably, less
reprehensible than in the case at bar. The bogus agreement clearly had the capacity to
influence the adjudication and to hinder Mobil's presentation of its case."" As in this case
the Respondent's bogus survey and other documents clearly influenced the jury's
decision. ""The failure of a party's corrupt plan does not immunize the defrauder from
the consequences of his misconduct. When Aoude concocted the agreement, and
thereafter when he and his counsel annexed it to the complaint, they plainly thought it
material. That being so, "[t]hey are in no position now to dispute its effectiveness."
Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 247, 64 S.Ct. at 1002. See also Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault
Ste. Marie Rv. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-22, 51 S.Ct. 501, 502, 75 L.Ed. 1243
(1931) (litigant who engages in misconduct "will not be permitted the benefit of
calculation, which can be little better than speculation, as to the extent of the wrong
inflicted upon his opponent").""
I. Consolidating Issues (u)(v)(w)(x)(bb) Judge Haynes Controversy and Bias

The Respondents officially amended their counter claims by adding trespass and
timber trespass on October 17, 2011 (See Clerks Record Pg. 71), thirteen (13) days after
Appellant was acquitted of the Felony Malicious Injury to Property charge.

Judge

Haynes did not respond to the Respondents Amendment until December 15, 2011 (See
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Clerks Record Pg. 76-77), almost two (2) months later.

The Certificate of Mailing

attached to said Order is dated September 19, 2011. There are discrepancies on both
documents and time lines exceed Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
On May 21, 2012, Appellant requested a hearing for Motion to Amend Pre-trial
Order, wherein Appellant requested under rules of discovery that the Respondent
surrender key pieces of information that were demanded on several prior discovery
requests (See Clerks Record Pgs. 113-121, Trial Transcript Pg. 76, Lines 17-25, Pg.81,

Lines 14-25 ).

The Respondents did not comply.

The Appellant objected to the

Respondents late disclosure of said additional evidence presented during trial
proceedings, approximately six (6) months after the Court Order.

Judge Haynes

overruled Appellants objections.
The Respondents ignored Judge Haynes Pre-Trial Conference Order, wherein all
Exhibit and Witness Lists were due no later than 5:00 P.M. on November 9, 2012 (See

Clerks Record Pg. 182-183). Respondents amended their lists five times by adding
additional exhibits and witnesses that were never disclosed in prior discovery: Original
list submitted 5/4/2012, Received by Appellant 5/4/2012 (Exhibits a-bb); Amended list
submitted 11/8/2012, Received by Appellant 11/9/2012 (Exhibits a-ll); 2nd Amended list
submitted 11/15/2012, Received by Appellant 11/16/2012 (Exhibits a-oo); 3rd Amended
list submitted 11/15/2012, Received by Appellant 11/19/2012 (Exhibits a-pp); 4th
Amended list submitted 11/26/2012, Received by Appellant 11/26/2012 (Exhibits a-rr ss, written in at trial).

Appellant objected to the Respondents untimely submitted

exhibits, yet Judge Haynes "overruled" said objections, which contributed to the collapse
of Appellants defense to said alleged evidence.
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Appellant requested waivers on court fees with her Notice of Appeal, as she is an
Indigent person.

The presiding Judge Penny Friedlander granted Appellant said fee

waivers. Judge Haynes then interfered with the Court Order and rescinded Appellants
said fee waivers for no justifiable reason on July 18, 2013.
The judge must consider the proper mix of factors and juxtapose them reasonably.
Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an
improper factor is relied upon (Monaco Survey, NJE.D. Claim, Late Disclosure of
Evidence and Exhibits), or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the
court makes a serious mistake in weighing them (Appellants Objection to Monaco
Unsigned Survey).

See "Independent Oil and Chemical Workers of Quincy, Inc. v.

Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.1988); See also Anderson v.
Crvovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir.1988) (to warrant reversal for abuse of
discretion, it must "plainly appear that the court below committed a meaningful error in
judgment").
Appellant believes that District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes
committed 'Fraud Upon the Court' as witnessed and verified by the Appellant on
December 30, 2013. Appellant was viewing her case file, wherein she observed the
Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes case file notes, in which Haynes stated "The only issue
that concerns me is the N.I.E.D. (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) claim being
dismissed ... We can play up the former counsel's decision and the no objection to putting
it to the jury later on." Judge Haynes had dismissed the Respondents N.I.E.D. claim with
prejudice a year and a half prior to trial. Judge Haynes exhibited blatant prejudice toward
the Appellant by negating his judicial duty to uphold his ruling by allowing the
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Respondents to resubmit their N .LE.D. claim, during trial proceedings, after he had
previously dismissed said claim (See Appellants Attached Exhibit #9).
Appellant believes that Judge Haynes should have disqualified himself as the
presiding judge in the civil action against the Respondents, wherein Appellant uncovered
evidence during and after the civil proceedings, which has undermined said proceedings.
Appellant discovered in March 2013 that Judge Lansing Haynes, his law clerk,
"Buck" Pennington, and Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, all belong to the local Catholic
association of the "Knights of Columbus", a fraternal Catholic order of men who call
themselves the "Brotherhood" " ... primarily to serve the Catholic Church, and
secondarily the men who are members, by providing a means and conduit through which
they may help each other ... " (See Transcript on Appeal Pg. 1038, Lines 7-25).
On the May 1, 2013, Hearing, Greenfield was shocked when Judge Haynes stated
"as such, theres no prejudice other than self-inflicted prejudice, 1 might characterize it,
not that a person doesn't have the right to represent themselves, but its just never a good
idea

if theres any other way around it" (See Transcript on Appeal Pg. I 089, Lines 20-24,

Motion for Reconsideration). Appellant NEVER planned on representing herself. Judge

Haynes allowed Appellants attorney, Ian D. Smith, to walk away with ALL of
Greenfield's money just prior to the scheduled court trial (See Trial Transcript for
February 27, 2012, Pg.JO, Lines 18-25, Pg.11, Lines 1-9)

In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an
objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If
a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and
impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." See Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.
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Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994). Courts have stated that a trial judge must always remain fair and
impartial. See Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1989).
"He must be ever mindful of the sensitive role [the court] plays in a jury trial and avoid
even the appearance of advocacy or partiality." Id. quoting United States v. Harris, 501
F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is
not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988) "what matters is not the reality
of bias or prejudice but its appearance"; See United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191
(7th Cir. 1985).
Two principal Federal statutes dealing with judicial recusal are 28 U.S.C. §144,
"Bias or prejudice of judge" and 28 U.S.C. §455, "Disqualification of justice, judge, or
magistrate."

Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is intended to

protect litigants from actual bias and promote public confidence in the judicial process.
The Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any
proceeding in which impartiality might reasonably be questioned." See Taylor v. O'Grady,
888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the
Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that
he believes that he has received justice."
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice", See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S. Ct.
1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954).
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking

APPELLANT BRIEF

62

for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We
think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no
motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
If a judge does not disqualify himself, then the judge is in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845
(7th Cir. 1996) "The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on
section 144, but on the Due Process Clause." "The Supreme Court has also held that if a
judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in
treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by
law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in
criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with
interstate commerce."

See Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989) ""The district
courts retain the inherent power to do what is necessary and proper to conduct judicial
business in a satisfactory manner. As we have said, that inherent power is "rooted in the
chancellor's equity powers, 'to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion.' "
HMG Property, 847 F.2d at 915 (quoting ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton,
569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir.1978)). The courts' inherent power includes "the ability to
do whatever is reasonably necessary to deter abuse of the judicial process." Eash v.
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 567 (3d Cir.1985) (en bane).
IV.REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Finally, as a pro se litigant, inexperienced in the art of drafting pleadings, I would appreciate
the opportunity to offer oral argument in support of this brief.
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V. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the rulings of the District Court and
remand this case for further proceedings, including the right to perform additional reasonable
discovery and / or;
1. Reverse the District Court ruling that the River Cove Bed and Breakfast is not prohibited
by the Park Wood Place Subdivision CC&Rs;
2. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Arborvitae hedge does not constitute a Fence;
3. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Arborvitae shrubs are not exceeding the height
restrictions for fences as set forth in the Park Wood Place CC&Rs;
4. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Appellant did not suffer from the Respondents
negligent actions and Appellant should be awarded damages for Nuisances;
5. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Arborvitae Hedge is not a nuisance and
therefore should be Abated;
6. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Respondents should not be required to remove
all spite shrubs and trees that are impeding Appellants river view and the free use of
property, and interferes with the Appellant's comfortable enjoyment oflife and property;
7. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Appellant did not suffer from the Respondents
actions and award damages to Appellant for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
8. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Appellant did not suffer from the Respondents
actions and award damages to Appellant for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress;
9. Should this Court decide that Judge Lansing Haynes should have disqualified himself
from said proceedings, therefore nullifying all Court Orders, then Order a New Trial with
all Statute of Limitations kept intact and void all Final Judgments and awards.
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DATED this 25 th day of June, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25 th day of June, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
John C. Riseborough
Paine Hamblen, LLP
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, WA 99201

[X] U.S. Mail
[X] HAND DELIVERED

The Supreme Court of Idaho
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101

[X] U.S. Mail
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Item
Description of

12/31/2.010

Property

Date
Placed In

"*"' indicates DISPOSED

Service

No.

Stereo System

1
2
2

TV
Bed

3

Entertainment Center

1/5/1997

3

SPA

6/4/1995

4

Bed
Grandfather Clock

211/1999
12/23/1995

Bed

1/1/1999
10/a,'1995
3/1/1999
411 4/1995
5/14/1998

4

5/611994
2122/1997
5/28/1994

5
5
6

Sofa

6

Blinds

7

Paddle Boat
•• Washer/Dryer
5/1 9/1998
Printer
o/21/1998
Computer
6/211997
Gas Fireplace
12/15/1998
Mower
7/1/1998
5/8/1994
Bed and Breakfast
2000 Chapponal Guest Boat 5/1412001
Flooring for B&B rooms
8/15/2004
Outdoor Music System
8
Outdoor Patio Water Feature
Garden Arbor
2005 Planning Surveying
Laptop Computer
Entry Doors
Dlrrlng Furniture
W8$her/Dryer

8
9
9
10
11

~12
19
20

24
25
25

26

26
26
27
28

OIi Painting

Sub Totals
Le$$: Disposed Assets
Ending Totals

Asset
Code

Bus.
Use
%

Eric J and Rosa~11d D Wunnllnser
288140
0
Cost or
Sec. 179
Credit
other
Deduction
Basis

0

1,075
578
252
925

0
0
0
0

6,391
66!;1

0

1,364
785

0
0
0

653

0

750
582

380
608
560

608)

;m.~

0
Salvage
Value

Q

0
.0)
0

2,356
0)
H56

b,

I

/()

'}
147 139
Prior Accum.
Depree.,
179 Bonus

Recovery

1,055
578
252
925
6,391

0 .
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
599
0
274
1,483
0
O}

241 482
Recovery
Basis

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 •

2

0

3'A

288,140

2356
Special
Allowance

:·'
(u

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

380
608
560
3,224
2,283

330
118,488

60,538
3,790
3,340
24,725
673

5,055
599
1,110
273
1,483

7
7
7

5
5
5
5
5
5
31 .5
5
39
7

15
7
27.5

HY
HY
HY
HY
HY ··
HY
MQ3
MQ3
MQ3

HY
MQ4
MQ3

MM
HY
MM

HY
HY
HY
MM

6

HY

27.5
7

MM

5

HY
HY .

668
1,364
784
653
750
582
380.. .

600

560
3,224
2,283
329
64,531
46,426
538
2,296
9,316

463
836
911

123
313

o.

147,1:39

0

2 41 ,482

O}
Q

608)

roai

2~,8~

l~,lr3l
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Joseph
Malloy

11

or

lL

buddy buddy with def, put been in his home twice. Don't hang
out, never been in his boat. He turns on my water and blows it
out, we split rental of the equipment. 8-6 roughly. Saw Dwight
and you load truck. Only time I've seen several truck loads with
tarp over a couple of days. Easter weekend. Detective
Gunderson called me. Comments by def about you and likewise
with you about him. We haven't spoken recently, about a dozen
in the past. Wasn't aware Dwight had a brother until about a
year ago. Def said it was a twin brother.
Redirect.

01:41:03 PM
Joseph
Malloy

He didn't have a full white beard. I was asked to sign resolution
that def were good neighbors. It was all true. I went to pit's
house to tell her that I had done that. She wanted to know if
anything said in it about her. I said if names were switched I'd
sign it. She said def would learn if you mess with the bull you
get the horns.
ss.
Object.
Sustains.
Have video depo to play, marks as exhibit TT. DVD deposition
of John Monaco.

ohn Monaco is played.
fternoon recess, 10 mins. Admonishes jurors.
ack on the record.
Moves to admit exhibt B from the video.

DA/Pit

J

Plays deposition video of Tim

astning.

IMoves to admit C and Page 2 of 0.
Admits 0-2
Admits exhibit C.
Recess for the day. Reconvene at 9 am tomorrow. Admonishes

£.el.~'£; /d!-.3
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J
J
05:46:39 PM
06:43:09 PM

J

Back on the record. Mr. Riseborough is not present. Pit is
present. DA was called and not answered.

J

Question by jury, asking to define timber trespass. I intend to
answer #16 defines trespass and #19 defines trepass.

It

No objection.
Jury is seated. I instructed parties to be within 10 mins. We have
called DA a few times. I instruct the jury that instruction 16
defines trespass and 19 defines timber trespass.

's verdict.

07:59:50 PM J
08:03:10 PM J
08:05:08 PM
J

hanks jurors. Excuses jurors.
DA to produce order that reflects verdict. Now still some court
trial issues to be addressed. Will schedule a status conference
in the future regarding equity matter.

Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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KO CO PROSECUTER

P. 001/002

FAX No. 208-446-1841

BARRY McHUOH
Prosecuting Attorney
50'1 ·Govt. Way/Box 9000
Coeurd'Alene,ID 83814
'felepbone: (208) 446-1800
Fax: (208}446-1833
IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE IR.ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FO. THE COUNTY·OFK.OOTENAI

Case No. C.R-Fl0-10624

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plwntiff,

vs.

·SECOND AMENDED
·INJl'oRMATION ..

·CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD,

REPORT #10P,Ji'OS642-P.FPD

DOB:
SSN:
Defendant. ·

COMES NOW, AMY BORGMAN, Dep ty Prosecutor for Kootenai County, State ofldaho,
and hereby amends the infonnation in this action: . d complains that1he above:named defendant did

commit the crime ~f MALICIOUS

JNJURJT.• PROPERTY, aFeloqy.• Idaho Code Section"l8-

. 7001, 18-204, committed as follows:

·
. GREENFIELD, onorabontthe 10111-.24111 d4yof

· ~attheDefendant,CHIUSTINA

March, 201 0,"in the' County ofKooteruu, State o , dabo, did.aid and.abet anothor.in the commission .
.. of and/or did herself maliciousty"irijure and/or de· trQy certainTeal or:persomilpropet'\y., io-wit:itees

and/or shrubs, of a value 1n excess of One·

ousand Doilers ($1,000). ·the prop~ of Eric

WurmlinFt, analor.properfYwhic'h was jointly

edbyEiic Wuntjlinger and1heDefcrulant,. where

Eric Wunnlinger did not._gi-ve the Defendant pc

·ssion 10 irijuzy or- destrQy _sucb. :.proporty, ~l of

.

.SECOND :A.MBNDED :J:ltlf.ORMATION·:

Pag,

1

.

.

Officer Report for Incident 10PF05642

Page 9 of 11

Supplemental by Det:. RL Gunderson:

12/06/10, 7he KCPA's office wanted me to obtain a current and certified copy of
the City of Post Falls ordinance related to Shrubs & Fences. I did obtain those
records from Carol Fairhurst today and will provide those to the KCPA. ~he
wording relating Shrubs & Fences was removed from the ordinance. The ordinance
now only pertains to Fences. R~G
12/07/10, 09:40, I wil::. be ::aking this ordinance copy to t:he KCPA t:ris a.m. RLG
12/09/10, 16:30, I met with KCPA Barry McHugh and the Wurmlingers at the KCPA
office. It was determined that a survey of the property is needed to verify the
exact property line. Eric stated he would contact the company he previously had
locate a mid property line (I.N.C. company in Post Falls).
12/16/10, 10:48, I arrived to 212 Parkwood P::..ace. Surveyer's from I.N.C. had
been working a couple of hours already, locating the property lines. I met with
I.N.C. employee's, Brian Griffith & Jeff Ear::..ing. They continued working while
Eric Wurmlinger invited me into his house. He had prepared a document indicating
t.he heigr.t cf the tree's and the approximate amount of tree which was cut. He
numbered the tree's in his report:, one through ten, indicating each of the
affected tree's, cou.~ting from east to west in direction. He also provided me
with a list of names of those who could verify that it was Dwight Greenfield whc
was assisting Chris Greenfield on the Easter weekend, 2010, by hau::..ing loads of
cut shrubs in his pickup truck. Those persons are:
l l Joe Malloy
2)
3 l }\.shley Evans
another neighbor could also verify the approximate height of the cut: tree's,
prior to the incident. her name is Ash::..ey Labau • • • • • • • •, I asked Eric to
fax a copy of that: document to the PFPD for me.
The survey was completed at about 11::5 am, about the time Chris Greenfield
exited her house. The crew set up a ~ine to show the exact points of the
property line. I Photographed the line to try to accurately show where that line
was located. Chris Greenfield was also present taking photos from her side of
the property and made it clear that nobody was to cross over onto her property.
All persons respected her property rights without crossing onto her side.
I returned to the PFPD and not:.ified Barry Mchugh of the results o:: the survey
and provided some photos which accurately depict t:.he scene. Eric Wumlinger had
been billed $450.00 for the line marking, a cost which the KCPA/ PFPD had agreed
to pay to have this boundary line identified. RLG

12/21/10, 13:18, I called and ::..eft:. a voice message for Ashley Evans, requesting
he return my phone call.
12/21/10, 13:20, I called and spoke to Ashley Labau regarding her observations.
She said they lived on the opposite side of Chris Greenfield at 208 Parkwood
Place, and moved out about March, 2009. She said Chris had commented about her
intentions of cutting down the row of trees during a conversation with her. She
said Chris told her the trees were blocking her view. Ashley said they moved out
of the neighborhood before the trees were cut down. She did see them after they
were cut, and verified that several feet of the trees was cut off.

08/15/12

I

Christina J. Greenfield
210 S. Parkwood Place
Post Falls, ID 83854
Phone: (208) 773-0400
Plaintiff Pro Se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD
Plaintiff,

vs.

ERIC J. WURMLINGER an
ROSALYNND. WURMLINGER

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Defendant( s),
_________________

DATED this 19th day ofNovember, 2012

CASE NO.

CV-10 -8209

PLAINTIFF AMENDED
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM AND
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ERIC J. WURMLINGER,
ROSALYNN D. WURMLINGER
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 10-8209
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

WE, THE JURY, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No. 1: Does the Defendants' operation of the Rivercove Bed and Breakfast violate the
Parkwood Place Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&R's)?
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes _ _ No _ __
Question No. 2: Have Defendants planted tall growing arborvitae shrubs on or near the property

line between the Plaintiff's real property and the Defendants' real property?
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes ___ No _ _
Question No. 3: Does the arborvitae hedge constitute a fence?
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes _ _ No _ _
Question No. 4: Have Defendants arborvitae shrubs grown in excess of that which is allowed
by the Parkwood Place Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&R' s)?
Answer to Question No. 4: Yes ___ No _ _
Question No. 5: Did the Defendants obstruct and / or block the Parkwood Place pedestrian

easement?
Answer to Question No. 5: Yes ___ No _ _
Question No. 6: Do the Defendants shrubs and / or trees block the Plaintiff's view of the

Spokane river and obstruct the Plaintiff's free use of property?
Answer to Question No. 6: Yes ___ No _ _

Question No. 7: Did the actions of the Defendants planting of trees and / or shrubs obscuring
the Plaintiffs view result in the reduction in the value of her real property?
Answer to Question No. 7: Yes ___ No _ __
Question No. 8: Did the Defendants refusal to maintain the arborvitae hedge constitute a
nuisance?
Answer to Question No. 8: Yes

--- No ---

Question No. 9: Did the Defendants operation of the Rivercove Bed and Breakfast constitute a
nuisance?
Answer to Question No. 9: Yes

--- No ---

Question No. 10: Did the Defendants operation of the Rivercove Bed and Breakfast interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of Plaintiffs comfortable enjoyment of life and property?
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes ___ No _ __
Question No. 11: Did the Defendants' falsely report a crime and accuse the Plaintiff of
Malicious Irtjury to Property for trimming the arborvitae hedge?
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes ___ No _ __
Question No. 12: Did the Defendants' intentionally-and/ or recklessly make other false
accusations to law enforcement about the Plaintiff?
Answer to Question No. 12: Yes

--- No ---

Question No. 13: Did the Defendants' engage in a course of conduct to harass the Plaintiffl
Answer to Question No. 13: Yes ___ No _ __
Question No. 14: Were the Defendants actions negligent, and if so, was this negligence a direct
and proximate cause of Plaintiffs damages?
Answer to Question No. 14: Yes ___ No _ __
Question No. 15: Were the Defendants actions negligent, and if so, was this negligence a direct
and proximate cause of Plaintiffs emotional distress?
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes ___ No _ __
Question No. 16: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Plaintiffs as a result of
her damages:
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CONFIDENTIAL BENCH MEMORANDUM

Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, et al.
CV 10-8209
PARTIES:
Plaintiff:
Defendants:
ATTORNEYS:
Plaintiff:
Defendants:

Christina Greenfield
Eric and Rosalynd Wurmlinger (husband and wife)

Pro Se
.John Riscborough and Trevor Frank

1·i.

Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judgment;
: 2. Plaintiff's Motion .Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)

I. Introduction
In her Complaint Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant ("Greenfield") asserted legal claims
for nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress. as well as equitable claims praying for
injunctive and abatement relief

In their Counterclaim, the Defendants/Counterclaimants

("Wurmlingers") asserted legal claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass and
ti m bcr trespass.
On November 26. 2012, a five-day jury trial commenced in this matter as to the legal
claims asserted by the parties, with the Court reserving Greenfield's equitable claims for
determination by court trial.

Greenfield was represented pro se and the Wurmlingers were

represented by attorney John C. Riseborough.
On November 30, 2012, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Wurrnlingers
on each of Greenfield's claims, and found in favor of the Wurmlingers on their counterclaims.
As to Greenfield's claims, the jury found that the Wunnlingers' maintenance of their arborvitae
and/or operation of their bed and breakfast did not constitute nuisances. Additionally, the jury

it

1,

I r· 1.df--1,
(/~
\
/
6/"JS)

£~,(tLElJ1 f'

found that the Wurmlingers had not inflicted emotional distress upon Greenfield.

As to the

Wurmlingers' counterclaims, the jury found that Greenfield had committed trespass, but did not
award trespass damages.

Additionally. the jury found that the arborvitae were trees and that

Greenfield committed timber trespass.

The jury awarded the Wurmlingers timber trespass

damages in the amount of $17,000.00. Lastly, the jury found that Greenfield's general conduct
negligently inflicted emotional distress on the Wurmlingers, and that the negligence was the
proximate cause of the Wurmlingers' damages. The jury awarded the Wurrnlingers negligent
infliction of emotional distress damages in the amount of $52,000.00.
On December l 0, 2012, Greenfield filed her Motion to Set Aside .Judgment Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the VerdicL and the Affidavit of Christina Greenfield. On December
2 L 20 I 2. the Wurm Iingers filed their opposition brief. On January 7. 2012, this Court entered its
Order Establishing Post Jury Trial Judgment and its Jury Trial Judgment. On January 14. 2012,
Greenfield filed her reply brief.
Greenfield's motions came on for hearing on January 16. 2013, and after hearing
argumenL the Court took the motions under advisement.

II. Summarv of Arguments
Greenfield has brought her Motion to Set Aside the Judgment pursuant to l.R.C.P. 60( a)
and (b), and her Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to l.R.C.P. 50(6). In
general, Greenfield argues, "Plaintiff believes that the jury would have formulated a different
opinion if they hadn't been tricked into believing that the arborvitae hedge was solely owned by
the Defendants', a decision that was based on the admission of the Defendants' deceitful
survey." Plaintiff's Motions at p. 22.

Argument
1. JNOV:
Wurmlingers

O[mosition

Rep!"

Constitutional and
statutory

Analvsis
Procedurally, I note that
Greenfield requests that the

2

fV. Analvsis
The only issue that concerns me is the NIED claim being dismissed. We can play up the
fonner counsel's decision and the no objection to putting it to the jury later on.
As to reserving ruling on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment. the CC&R issue does relate
to the court trial but there is a judgment entered on the other issues. Will have to ask her about
that at the hearing. Also. need to hear about NIED counterclaim dismissal issue.

Camphell. supra. discusses fraud upon the court.
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
suppo1i a conclusion: it is more than a scintilla. hut less than a preponderance." Evans,·. ffara's.
Inc., 123 Idaho 473,478. 849 P.2d 934. 939 (1993) ( citation omitted l.

As to the NIED claim. the ISC provided in Belstler v. Conine:
B. The district court did not err in enjoining the Belstlers from relocating the private driveway
easement.

1. The district court had jurisdiction to decide this issue.
The Belstlers argue that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction w enjoin any
rights pursuant to J.C. § 55-313 to relocate an easement found to exist by the court in its
decision. They argue that the relocation issue was not pied or argued before the district court. and
that although they pled relocation in their complaint, their amended complaint no longer referred
to relocation as an issue. Additionally, they argue that there was no explicit reference to J.C. §
5 5-313 at trial, and that they did not agree to have the relocation issue decided at trial. Further.
any references at trial to relocation, they argue referred to settlement and mediation offers.
The December 30, 2009 Memorandum Decision stated that the:
[P]aiiies did extensively litigate the relocation issue at trial and the pleadings are deemed
amended to include a claim for relocation of the northerly easement. Throughout the trial the
parties took the position that if the court should determine that the easements claimed by the
CONINES are valid easements, the Court should then determine whether or not the
BELSTLERS could, pursuant to I.C. § 55-313 change the location of the northerly easement.
Therefore. that issue is ripe for detennination at this time by this Court.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule l 5(b J states in relevant pan that:

9

